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Notes
HAVE YOU SEEN MY INBOX? GOVERNMENT
OVERSTEPS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AGAIN: GOODBYE TELEPHONES, HELLO EMAIL
I. INTRODUCTION
Its salient characteristics, particularly ease of use and informality, lead to
the ‘immortalizing’ of information that normally would never be written down
or distributed in an office memo.1
Happily married John Jones, a father of four and a self-employed
contractor, conducts as many personal and business transactions as he
can via the Internet to free up time for his family.2 Along with managing
his bank accounts, John pays the electric, water, credit card, health
insurance, car payment, car insurance, and phone bills online via
electronic mail (“e-mail”). John corresponds via e-mail with his doctor
regarding his son’s severe allergy condition and with his attorney
regarding real estate investments, business practices, and general legal
questions. John receives payment confirmations by e-mail for paid bills
that he archives on his Internet server, Smalltown.net. Smalltown.net is
a local company that serves a small town of approximately two thousand
people.
Unbeknownst to John, a recent increase in fraudulent health
insurance claims regarding steroids resulted in government
investigation. Monthly, John makes claims on behalf of his son for a
steroid medication used to treat his son’s allergies. The government,
having an interest in the Jones family health claims because of the
steroidal prescription, obtained a warrant to seize John’s e-mail based on
knowledge that John receives his insurance statements electronically.
The government faxed this warrant to Smalltown.net demanding all
John Jones’s e-mails for the past year that contained the keywords
“health,” “medication,” or “steroids.”
41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
The above hypothetical was inspired by Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490
F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App.
LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007)
(Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). This fact
pattern was created by the author of this Note, and any similarities to real persons or facts
are entirely coincidental.
1
2
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Smalltown.net ran a term search and printed all of the hits. Two
people handled the requested documents—a server technician and a
nosy secretary, Betty Eyez, who bundled up the documents and
packaged them for the government officials. Ninety percent of the emails in John Jones’s account hit for one of the above terms, including
credit card and bank statements, health insurance claims, and attorney
correspondence. While waiting for the printing to finish, Betty Eyez
glanced through some of John Jones’s e-mails. Betty Eyez’s two children
attend the same middle school as the Jones children; later, Eyez’s
children spread rumors at school that John Jones is a drug addict who
spends thousands of dollars on products from QVC, a large multimedia
retailer, each year and has questionable business banking practices.
The breach of John Jones’s privacy is an unconstitutional violation of
the guarantees of trustworthiness provided by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.3 In light of recent decisions by United
States district courts, ancient electronic communications law, and the
Stored Communications Act, the Smalltown.net scenario is certainly
plausible. This Note discusses and analyzes the current law regarding
governmental seizure of private e-mails that permits encroachment on
constitutional guarantees of privacy.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that current procedural
provisions governing governmental entities that desire to obtain e-mails
as evidence from third-party service providers under Title II of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), also known as the
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), are unconstitutional. These
provisions violate the Fourth Amendment’s privacy guarantees because
the pro-government provisions severely outweigh the privacy
guaranteed to e-mail account holders. Part II of this Note examines the
history of the Fourth Amendment and discusses sections 2703, 2704, and
2705 of the SCA, which address disclosure of customer e-mail from

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Establishing that evidence against an accused
must satisfy “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 66. The Court stated
that it
found no commentary suggesting that the Court has misidentified the
basic interests to be accommodated. Nor has any commentator
demonstrated that prevailing analysis is out of line with the intentions
of the Framers of the Sixth Amendment. . . . [W]e reject the invitation
to overrule a near-century of jurisprudence. Our reluctance to begin
anew is heightened by the Court’s implicit prior rejection of principal
alternative proposals . . . .
Id. at 66 n.9.

3
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service providers and aspects of delayed notice.4 Part III analyzes the
constitutional problems presented by sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA,
noting, specifically, the disparity in safeguards afforded to the
government as compared to account holding individuals.5 Part IV
proposes amendments to the SCA that will more effectively protect the
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens without jeopardizing the
government’s interest in preserving electronic evidence.6 Finally, Part V
analyzes the hypothetical introduced above under these proposed
amendments to the SCA.7
II. BACKGROUND
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the
storm may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot
enter!—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!8
The sanctity of privacy that William Pitt publicly announced
regarding the Crown’s ability to conduct searches and seizures in the
eighteenth century governs e-mail today. Because general warrants
violate natural expectations of privacy, our forefathers incorporated the
Fourth Amendment into the Bill of Rights in order to enshrine powerful
constitutional protection to a practice that had been gradually achieved
in Great Britain.9 Yet, new technologies have created new challenges for

4
See infra Part II (discussing Internet technology, the history of electronic
communications law, and relatively recent applications of electronic communications law
to e-mail and Internet searching).
5
See infra Part III (analyzing the overwhelming unconstitutional possibilities created by
reading sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 together and the inconsistent judicial interpretations
of these provisions).
6
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the current SCA provisions governing email seizure to provide for more universal application, require police officer presence
during seizures, and clarify objective terminology so that courts will have clear meaning).
7
See infra Part V.
8
William Pitt, The Elder, Earl of Chatham, Speech on the Excise Bill, Parliament (March
1763), reprinted in HENRY PETER BROUGHAM, 1 HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF STATESMEN WHO
FLOURISHED IN THE TIME OF GEORGE III 42 (Richard Griffin & Company 1839).
9
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. But c.f. David E. Steinberg, Self-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth
Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 482–84 (2007) (suggesting that three specific
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the historically cherished Anglo-American right to privacy.10 Electronic
communications statutes embody outdated technological theories and
fail to protect privacy interests.11 Part II.A provides a brief description of
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).12 Part II.B then discusses the
background of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relevant to Title II of
the SCA.13 Finally, Part II.C introduces the procedural aspects of sections
2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA.14
A. What Is an Internet Service Provider?
ISPs allow individuals to access accounts from which they may send
and receive e-mail.15 The server itself may be local, or it may be wide,
controversies—the John Wilkes cases, the Paxton’s case, and the Townshend Act—led to
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment).
10
David Snyder, The NSA’s “General Warrants”: How the Founding Fathers Fought an 18th
Century Version of the President’s Illegal Domestic Spying, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/generalwarrantsmemo.pdf (last visited
Jan. 31, 2008) [hereinafter “Snyder”] (posing the question as to whether America will follow
the Framers’ intent to step away from King George’s “unfettered executive power”). Id.
Snyder states that
[w]e’ve now come full circle. The president has essentially updated
this page from King George’s playbook, engaging in dragnet
surveillance of millions of Americans, regardless of whether they are
suspected of a crime. The founders of this country took steps to limit
precisely this sort of unfettered executive power. Will we?
Id.
11
Robert A. Pikowsky, An Argument for a Technology-Neutral Statute Governing
Wiretapping and Interception of E-mail, 47-OCT ADVOC 23 (2004) (stating that “[t]he
outdated statutory scheme creates a needlessly complex set of rules that unduly focuses on
the different technologies of communication rather than the underlying privacy interest,
which remains constant regardless of the technology employed to convey the message[]”).
12
See infra Part II.A (explaining the basic functions of Internet Service Providers and email).
13
See infra Part II.B (setting forth the birth of electronic communications leading up to
the governance of e-mail, and discussing false notions of privacy and the reasonableness of
searches).
14
See infra Part II.C (discussing procedural aspects of three sections of the SCA).
15
E-mail is defined in the Senate Report for the ECPA as
a form of communication by which private correspondence is
transmitted over public and private telephone lines. In its most
common form, messages are typed into a computer terminal, and then
transmitted over telephone lines to a recipient computer operated by
an electronic mail company. If the intended addressee subscribes to
the service, the message is stored by the company’s computer “mail
box” until the subscriber calls the company to retrieve its mail, which
is then routed over the telephone system to the recipient’s computer.
If the addressee is not a subscriber to the service, the electronic mail
company can put the message onto paper and then deposit it in the
normal postal system.
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such as the Internet.16 The Internet is not a centralized system and can be
thought of as a “crazy game of connect-the-dots.”17 ISPs give individuals
Electronic mail systems may be available for public use or may be
proprietary, such as systems operated by private companies for
internal correspondence.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 8 (1986). This definition of e-mail transmissions over telephone lines
exemplifies the pace at which technology is progressing. Today, eighteen years later, the
transmissions occur over telephone lines, digital subscriber lines (“DSLs”), and cable lines.
This is not to say that the definition is not applicable. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 405 (11th ed. 2004). Compared to the Senate Report, Merriam-Webster’s
definition essentially gets the same point across but appears to assume that the reader is
familiar with the concept of e-mail; Merriam-Webster defines e-mail as “a means or system
for transmitting messages electronically (as between computers on a network)”; and
“messages sent and received electronically through an e-mail system[.]” Id. See also MSN.
Encarta, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761566348/E-Mail.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2008). E-mail is defined as a “method of transmitting data, text files, digital photos, or
audio and video files from one computer to another” over a condensed or broad network.
Id. Since the 1990s, e-mail has greatly enhanced the communications of both businesses
and individuals. Id.
16
See Glossary of Internet & Web Jargon, UC BERKELEY—TEACHING LIBRARY INTERNET
WORKSHOPS, http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/TeachingLib/Guides/Internet/Glossary.html
#RSS (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). The “Internet” is defined as
[t]he vast collection of interconnected networks that all use the TCP/IP
protocols and that evolved from the ARPANET of the late 60’s and
early 70’s. An “internet” (lower case i) is any computers connected to
each other (a network), and are not part of the Internet unless the [sic]
use TCP/IP protocols. An “intranet” is a private network inside a
company or organization that uses the same kinds of software that you
would find on the public Internet, but that is only for internal use. An
intranet may be on the Internet or may simply be a network.
Id. Further, a “server” may be defined as
[a] computer running that software, assigned an IP address, and
connected to the Internet so that it can provide documents via the
World Wide Web. Also called HOST computer. Web servers are the
closest equivalent to what in the print world is called the “publisher”
of a print document. An important difference is that most print
publishers carefully edit the content and quality of their publications
in an effort to market them and future publications. This convention is
not required in the Web world, where anyone can be a publisher;
careful evaluation of Web pages is therefore mandatory. Also called a
“Host.”
Id. See also MSN. Encarta, supra note 15. Servers are computers that supply “services or
data to other machines on a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN) such
as the Internet.” Id. Essentially, files, pictures, codes, and messages are transmitted back
and forth between servers throughout the network. Id.
17
Rob Kolstad, Becoming an Internet Service Provider, http://docs.rinet.ru/becomeISP/
(last visited Jan. 31, 2008). Kolstad notes that the Internet’s connectivity aspects are “not
organized like an army with a ‘President’ node at the top with ‘General’ nodes directly
beneath it. The Internet is more like a hodge-podge of various interconnections that
resemble more a crazy game of connect-the-dots than a cleverly designed backbone-withbranches.” Id. Furthermore,
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the means to send messages from individual computers via commercial
e-mail programs or mail-user agents.18 Essentially, ISPs provide account
holders the ability to send, receive, and store opened and unopened emails associated with the ISPs’ systems, which may also be thought of as
the mail servers themselves.19 The e-mails stored on ISP systems are
available for different lengths of time depending on the server.20 Having

To connect to the Internet, one identifies an ‘Internet Service Provider’
(ISP) that is already connected to the Internet and negotiates a business
agreement to join the Internet through them. The list of ISPs is large
and includes tiny ISPs with a single computer and some dial-in lines
and large ISPs with thousands of miles of fiber strung around the
country. Different ISPs offer different strengths and different costs.
Id.
18
MSN Encarta, supra note 15. Most commercial or mail-user programs have text
editors for composing messages, and all the sender needs to provide is a destination
address. Id. See R. Kayne, What is a Mail User Agent, http://www.wisegeek.com/whatis-a-mail-user-agent.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). Wise Geek defines mail user agent as
follows:
A mail user agent (MUA) is an email program; software designed to
collect and send electronic mail. It is also referred to as an email
program, or email client. The term “mail user agent” is less familiar to
the average person, but is used in email headers. The headers of the
email supply information to the mail servers or computers that handle
transferring messages across networks like the Internet.
Id. See KENNETH E. JOHNSON, THE LAWYER’S QUICK GUIDE TO E-MAIL 10 (1998). The actual
communication process for e-mails takes place as follows:
When you are ready to send or receive e-mail, you log on to the
Internet through your ISP. Your e-mail program communicates with
the mail server at the ISP through “protocols,” which are simply
definitions of how computers talk to one another. Standard protocols
allow different computers and computers with different operating
systems and software to communicate reliably, since they all speak the
same “language.”
Id.
19
AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (APRI), NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
ASSOCIATION, THE ECPA, ISPS & OBTAINING E-MAIL: A PRIMER FOR LOCAL PROSECUTORS 10
(2005), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ecpa_isps_obtaining_email_05.pdf.
20
Id. at 20. The APRI report addresses the problem of varying retention periods of ISPs:
Retention periods for subscriber and transactional records and e-mail
content records vary greatly among ISPs. Moreover, there are no
statutorily mandated or industry guidelines regarding preservation of
this information prior to request from law enforcement. Indeed, it is
not unusual for ISPs to dispose of e-mail information and content after
only days, even hours.
Id. See Jon Swartz & Kevin Johnson, U.S. Asks Internet Firms to Save Data, USA TODAY, June
1, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-05-31internet-records_x.htm. On a similar note, top law enforcement officials have requested
longer retention periods, than days or hours, of histories from Internet companies such as
Google, Microsoft, AOL, Comcast, and Verizon. Id. Problems associated with this request
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a basic understanding of how ISPs handle e-mail is essential to assessing
how much invasive power the government should have. Fourth
Amendment history and electronic communications case law is an
appropriate place to begin the discussion of shielding individuals from
the dangers of governmental privacy invasion.21
B. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Relevant To Title II of the Stored
Communications Act
In England, in the 1760s, motivated by the reign of King George III,
William Pitt declared certain individual rights fundamental, notoriously
advocated for freedom of speech, and chastised general warrants
granted by the King.22 In the United States, the Fourth Amendment
resulted because the former colonists of the states feared, and therefore
disliked, warrants that would allow the police to search any and all
persons—merely on the government’s whim.23 Contrary to these general
warrants, the Fourth Amendment’s text, which remains unchanged since
its adoption in 1793, guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures.24 In 1980, the United States Supreme Court held that
for longer retention periods are cost-based and Internet companies’ concerns for violating
operating policies. Id.
21
See infra Part II.B.
22
Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (C.P. 1763). In Wilkes, the court
eventually found forty-five general warrants invalid and declared general warrants “totally
subversive of the liberty of the [warrant’s] subject.” Id. (alteration in original).
23
See Snyder, supra note 10. Snyder notes that because a newspaper criticized the King
of England, the King signed off on any general warrants applicable to printers or those
taking part in publication. Id. The King’s officers obtained power to rummage through all
manuscripts and writings and cut through hundreds of locks. Id. Furthermore, the general
warrants “spurred colonists toward revolution and directly motivated James Madison’s
crafting of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (footnote omitted).
24
See supra note 9 (citing the text of the Fourth Amendment). See also Snyder, supra note
10. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XIV. Snyder correctly notes that James Madison relied
on the Massachusetts’ Constitution when drafting the Fourth Amendment. Snyder, supra
note 10. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XIV. The Massachusetts Constitution provided as
follows:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches,
and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his
possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or
affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make
search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons,
or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and
no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities
prescribed by the laws.
Id.
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“‘indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of
“general warrants” were the immediate evils that motivated the framing
and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.’”25 Since the Amendment’s
incorporation into the Constitution, courts have struggled to determine
exactly what types of searches are reasonable, especially in regard to
recent electronic communications.26 The relevant case law discussing
reasonable searches begins with the governance of telephone calls in Katz
v. United States and Smith v. Maryland.27

Snyder, supra note 10 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980)). See
Payton, 445 U.S. at 577. Payton explained why the “reasons for upholding warrantless
arrests in a public place do not apply to warrantless invasions of the privacy of the home.”
Id.
It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. Yet is [sic] is also well settled that objects such as
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the
police without a warrant. The seizure of property in plain view
involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable,
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with
criminal activity.
Id. at 586–87 (footnote omitted). The Court turned to common law in order to analyze the
fundamental importance of privacy in the home:
It is obvious that the common-law rule on warrantless home arrests
was not as clear as the rule on arrests in public places. Indeed,
particularly considering the prominence of Lord Coke, the weight of
authority as it appeared to the Framers was to the effect that a warrant
was required, or at the minimum that there were substantial risks in
proceeding without one.
The common-law sources display a
sensitivity to privacy interests that could not have been lost on the
Framers. The zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a
“man’s house is his castle,” made it abundantly clear that both in
England and in the Colonies “the freedom of one’s house” was one of
the most vital elements of English liberty.
Id. at 596–97 (footnote omitted).
26
James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to Keep Pace
with Technology, PRACTICING LAW INST. NO. 11253, 407, 412 (2007). Dempsey stated that
“[p]rivacy is an important constitutional value and a crucial component of the trust
necessary for the flourishing of digital commerce and democracy. However, while
technology has changed dramatically in the past twenty years, privacy law has not kept
pace.” Id.
27
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25
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Katz and Smith Establish Basic Standards for Evaluating Electronic
Communications28

The United States Supreme Court found itself torn between the
competing interests of privacy and security in the 1960s and 1970s when
it decided Katz and Smith.29 In analyzing the Fourth Amendment, these
judicial opinions distinguished the act of making a phone call from the
content of the call itself.30 In Katz, the Plaintiff’s telephone conversations
were captured while he spoke in a telephone booth.31 The Court noted
that the Plaintiff “sought to exclude when he entered the booth . . . not
the intruding eye . . . [but] the uninvited ear.”32 Relying on Katz and
Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. Katz and Smith set the stage as the relevant
case law governing electronic communication of telephone calls. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735;
Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
29
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. In Katz, the United States Supreme Court declared that
surveillance of telephone conversations amounted to a search where the caller “is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.” Id. The Court held that because of this entitlement, Defendant Katz did not give
up his privacy rights when he engaged in a telephone conversation. Id. See Snyder, supra
note 10, at 6. Snyder stated that “[i]n recognizing that [sic] the principle that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits indiscriminate searches regardless of the technology involved, the
Court made it plain that advanced technology doesn’t clear the government of the duty to
establish probable cause, and to receive a warrant, before rummaging through the private
lives of Americans.” Id. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 442 (1976). Further, in Miller,
the Defendant filed a motion to suppress records relating to his accounts at two banks after
alleging that the records had been illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. The Court held that, “[o]n their face, the documents subpoenaed here [we]re not
respondent’s ‘private papers[;]’ . . . respondent c[ould] assert neither ownership nor
possession. Instead, these [we]re the business records of the banks.” Id. at 440.
30
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan concurred, stating
that Katz holds only
(a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, a
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place
that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected
area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held,
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.
Id.
31
Id. at 352.
32
Id. The Court further noted:
He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls
from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a
business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a
telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
28
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Smith, courts have recognized that certain account information is
expected to be available to police powers without warrants, such as a list
of the numbers dialed from a phone, check information, and account
registration information.33 However, information that is not specifically
content-oriented is expected to be private because people have a right to
reasonably expect that private content will not be searched without a
warrant.34 In order to determine whether e-mail privacy is protected by
the Fourth Amendment, further examination of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is necessary. Smith set forth two requirements that are
necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment protection: first, a reasonable
expectation of privacy; and second, that the defendant’s expectation of
privacy is viewed as objectively reasonable by society.35
The first appropriate question raised in Smith is whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to email.36 Particularly in the private sector, the “third-party doctrine”37
ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in
private communication.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
33
United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078 (6th Cir. 1993). Phone and credit card
records have been found to be “readily accessible to employees during the normal course
of business[,]” and therefore Defendant may not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id.; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (discussing that where banking information, such as
checks and deposit slips, is available to employees during the normal course of business,
there can be no expectation of privacy). See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741. Further, in Smith, phone
number records recorded by a pen register are also banned from information of which an
individual may expect privacy. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006). Comparatively, in
regard to e-mail, the SCA has explicitly stated that e-mail account holder information is not
expected to be private and, therefore, may be obtained by police without notice being
provided to the customer. Id. Specifically, name, address, local and long distance
telephone records, length of service and type, any identifying numbers including assigned
network address, and means and source of payment are not generally expected to be
private information by individual account holders. Id.
34
See supra note 29 (discussing the opinion in Katz, which found that words uttered into
a mouthpiece are not expected to be broadcast to the world).
35
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (1979). Smith held that the reasonable expectation of privacy
embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual,
by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual
has shown that “he seeks to preserve [something] as private.” The
second question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’”—
whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual’s
expectation, viewed objectively, is “justifiable” under the
circumstances.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
36
Id. Smith held that application of the Fourth Amendment is directly dependent on
whether an individual has a “‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of
privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.” Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
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comes into play because many e-mail messages are designed to be sent
to a third party or stored on an Internet company’s remote server.38 The
third-party doctrine holds that once an individual voluntarily exposes
information to another individual, the original party that disclosed the
information no longer maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy
128, 143, 150, 151 (1978)); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Miller, 425 U.S. at
442; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Mancusi
v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
37
“Third-party doctrine” is phraseology used by the author of this Note. See Miller, 425
U.S. at 443; see also White, 401 U.S. at 752; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966);
Lopez v. United States 373 U.S. 427 (1963). The Court has consistently described the “thirdparty doctrine” as “information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him [the third
party] to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.” Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. See also White, 401 U.S. at 752; Hoffa, 385 U.S.
at 302; Lopez, 373 U.S. 427.
38
Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the
Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 22 (2007).
Lawless stated:
The messenger/recipient distinction is clearly exhibited in the context
of e-mail. If one sends an e-mail “to” America Online (AOL) for
account assistance, AOL would be the recipient of the message; on the
other hand, where AOL merely transmits the message and stores it on
its server, it is not the recipient of the communication but its
messenger.
Id. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987). The discussion in this Note is based
on private sector e-mail. See id. Courts adapt their analysis for governmental workplace
situations to use the “operational realities” test. See id. The Supreme Court acknowledged
the operational realities test for the first time in O’Connor. Id. In O’Connor, the Court held:
The operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some
employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is
by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Public
employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file
cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector,
may be reduced by virtue of [sic] actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. . . .
The employee’s
expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the
employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from
entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal
invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by
fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put,
it is the nature of government offices that others—such as fellow
employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public—
may have frequent access to an individual’s office.
Id. The operational realities test has its own discrepancies which are not discussed in this
Note, but for a general overview and examples especially regarding Internet searches, see
Lawless, supra note 38, at 22 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment is the proper remedial
tool for suppression of Internet search records).
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with regard to the information.39 Package and letter carrier services are
not third parties for purposes of this doctrine; instead, only the recipient
who opens the package qualifies as a third party.40 Comparably, if a
sufficient privacy interest applies to e-mails, then the government must
have probable cause to secure a warrant before seizing the e-mails.41 On
the contrary, if e-mails do not contain a sufficient privacy interest, then
the government must meet only a reasonable standard before seizing the
e-mails.42
Second, Smith advises that e-mail should be protected under the
Fourth Amendment when the user’s privacy interest is reasonable.43 For
example, in Warshak v. United States (“Warshak I”), the government seized
the Plaintiff’s e-mails directly from ISPs along with, as allowed by
federal statute, the Plaintiff’s account information.44 The government
39
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). In Jacobsen, employees of Federal
Express observed white powder that seemed to be concealed in four baggies within a tube
that protruded from a box damaged by transport. Id. at 111. The Court held that
defendants, addressees of package, had no expectation of privacy regarding the baggies
due to the unsealed condition of the package and the insurance policy that Federal Express
carried. Id. at 111, 119.
40
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,10 (1977); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397
U.S. 249, 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878). See supra note 37 (explaining
how the Court has described the third-party doctrine, and showing how package and letter
carrier services are not third parties for purposes of this doctrine).
41
Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 469 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other
grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified
by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). The court compared Phibbs and Miller to Katz and Smith,
where the issue in those cases was whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy for information desired by the government. Id. at 470. “The distinction between
Katz and Miller makes clear that the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry in the
context of shared communications must necessarily focus on two narrower questions than
the general fact that the communication was shared with another.” Id.
42
Id.
43
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
44
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 460, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). The
SCA distinguishes between account information, which the government is generally
allowed to obtain, and content of e-mail messages. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006); see also infra
note 123 and accompanying text for the statutory list of general account information. The
burden is much higher for content seizures than simply seizures of account information.
Id. In Warshak I, the Magistrate Judge issued an order which
Direct[ed] [the] internet service provider . . . to turn over to
government agents information pertaining to Warshak’s e-mail
account with NuVox. The information to be disclosed included (1)
customer account information, such as application information,
“account identifiers,” “[b]illing information to include bank account
numbers,” contact information, and “[any] other information
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argued that the Plaintiff had only a reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to e-mail, similar to the expectation of privacy for a letter
mailed by the United States Postal Service.45 E-mails resemble paper
letters because both typically have an addressed recipient.46 Similarly,
both electronic communications services and postal services carry items
that are clearly less private than paper letters, such as blogs,47 magazines,

pertaining to the customer, including set up, synchronization, etc.”; (2)
“[t]he contents of wire or electronic communications (not in electronic
storage unless greater than 181 days old) that were placed or stored in
directories or files owned or controlled” by Warshak; and (3) “[a]ll Log
files and backup tapes.”
490 F.3d at 460, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741
(6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II),
rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) (some alterations in
original) (emphasis added).
45
Id. Warshak argued that “the government could not get around the privacy interest
attached to a private letter by simply subpoenaing the postal service with no showing of
probable cause, because unlike in Phibbs, postal workers would not be expected to read the
letter in the normal course of business.” Id. at 471. Letters and packages have been
protected under the Fourth Amendment for more than two hundred years. See Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727. The Court acknowledged this protection of privacy in 1878 when it
decided in Ex parte Jackson that “[l]etters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as
fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and
weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.” Id.
at 733. And the Court observed further:
No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with
the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and
such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to
mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle
embodied in the fourth amendment [sic] of the Constitution.
Id.
46
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 472, vacated on other grounds en banc by U.S.App. LEXIS 23741
(6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II),
rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). E-mails “typically have a
limited, select number of recipients.” Id.
47
As defined by Merriam-Webster, a blog is “a Web site that contains an online personal
journal with reflections, comments, and often hyperlinks provided by the writer[.]”
Http://www.m-w.com/ (search “blog”). See also Glossary of Internet & Web Jargon, UC
BERKELEY—TEACHING LIBRARY INTERNET WORKSHOPS, http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/
TeachingLib/Guides/Internet/Glossary.html#Internet (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). The
Berkeley teaching library defines a blog as:
A blog (short for “web log”) is a type of web page that serves as a
publicly accessible personal journal (or log) for an individual.
Typically updated daily, blogs often reflect the personality of the
author. Blog software usually has an archive of old blog postings.
Many blogs can be searched for terms in the archive. Blogs have
become a vibrant, fast-growing medium for communication in
professional, poltical [sic], news, trendy, and other specialized web
communities. Many blogs provide RSS feeds [Rich Site Summary], to
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and leaflets and brochures addressed generically to “Resident.”48
Essentially, in the normal course of business, both ISPs and United States
postal workers are expected to refrain from reading the contents of
“sealed” items.49
Letters and e-mails, similar to phone calls, are not entitled to
absolute protection under the Fourth Amendment because their contents
may be disclosed by the recipient.50 As the Supreme Court explained,
“when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes
the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the
authorities[.]”51 This may seem like common sense because, as most
people learned in kindergarten, best friends do not always keep secrets.52
Unfortunately, due to statutory exceptions for both law enforcement and
emergencies, situations before the court are not always this simple.53
which one can subscribe and receive alerts to new postings in selected
blogs.
Id.
48
Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. The different levels of expectation of privacy simply
draws attention to the fact that some mailings, whether electronic or snail, are less private
than others. Id. The Court held in Ex Parte Jackson that:
[A] distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail matter,between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as
letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open
to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other
printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined.
Id. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001). Therefore, today, users of such
electronic communication, such as Internet bulletin boards and blogs, “would logically lack
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials intended for publication or public
posting.” Id.
49
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 471, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).
“Sealed” in the normal course of business refers to an item that is mailed with a specific
addressee and that is packaged and addressed correctly. Id.
50
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (stating that “when an
individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant
will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit governmental use of that information[]”). Upon sending information to
another individual, the sender loses his or her expectation of privacy because the receiver
can distribute the information as the receiver sees fit. Id.
51
Id.
52
See infra note 55 (discussing an instance in which the third-party rule prevailed against
a challenge to the Fourth Amendment because right to privacy does not extend to
voluntary third parties).
53
Warshak I, 490 F.3d. at 462, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).
“Portions of the SCA that are not directly at stake here prohibit unauthorized access of
electronic communications (§ 2701) and prohibit a service provider from divulging the
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However, generally, the recipient of information that was disclosed via
mail does not have the right to protect this information against
governmental searches, and this is known as the third-party exception to
individual expectations of privacy.54 Therefore, the recipient may be
subpoenaed to disclose the contents of a conversation, message, or letter,
and in such instances, the sender may not raise a Fourth Amendment
challenge.55
Of course, e-mail complicates matters because the
technological medium allows for inexpensive and indefinite storage
capacity.56 Still, similar to disclosure of information to a third-party in
the context of mail, if lowered expectations of privacy are established
with regard to e-mails, a Fourth Amendment challenge may be barred.57
The next two cases address one specific judge’s uneasiness with
breaching e-mail privacy.58
2.

Sister New York Cases—Doe I and Doe II: Lack of Notice

In both Doe v. Ashcroft (“Doe I”) and Doe v. Gonzales (“Doe II”), Judge
Marrero of the Southern District of New York declared unconstitutional
statutorily issued gag orders for government officials who obtained
electronic communications as evidence.59 Both cases, although later
partially overruled, discuss the importance of an individual’s privacy as
it relates to e-mail and Congress’s competing interest of maintaining
contents of electronic communications that it is storing for a customer with certain
exceptions pertaining to law enforcement needs (§ 2702).” Id.
54
SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 737 (1984). In SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, the
Court declared that “when a person communicates information to a third party, even on
the understanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third
party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities.” Id. at
735–36.
55
See United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). In King, the court stated
that “[o]nce frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate information . . . .”
Id.
56
See Dempsey, supra note 26, at 418. Dempsey explained the changes in storage space
and methods for storing since the enactment of the current laws, stating that
[i]n the past, particularly at the time when current email privacy laws
were written, email users accessed their email by downloading it onto
their personal computers. That process often resulted in the deletion
of the email from the computers of the service provider. Now, email-including email that has been read but which still has value to the
user--often sits on a third party server accessible via the Web.
Id.
57
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing expectations of privacy as established in Katz).
58
See infra Part II.B.3.
59
Doe v. Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), overruled in part by Doe,
Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d. Cir. 2008); Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).
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national security.60 First, in Doe I, in 2004, the court held that National
Security Letters (“NSLs”)61 used by the FBI were unconstitutional

60
Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549
F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v.
Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). In 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals took up
the issue and overruled in part Doe I and Doe II, declaring:
To recapitulate our conclusions, we (1) construe subsection 2709(c) to
permit a nondisclosure requirement only when senior FBI officials
certify that disclosure may result in an enumerated harm that is related
to “an authorized investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,” (2) construe
subsections 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) to place on the Government the
burden to show that a good reason exists to expect that disclosure of
receipt of an NSL will risk an enumerated harm, (3) construe
subsections 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) to mean that the Government satisfies
its burden when it makes an adequate demonstration as to why
disclosure in a particular case may result in an enumerated harm, (4)
rule that subsections 2709(c) and 3511(b) are unconstitutional to the extent
that they impose a nondisclosure requirement without placing on the
Government the burden of initiating judicial review of that requirement, and
(5) rule that subsections 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) are unconstitutional to the
extent that, upon such review, a governmental official's certification that
disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere
with diplomatic relations is treated as conclusive.
Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe III), 549 F.3d 861, 883 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (agreeing
in holdings (4) and (5) that certain provisions of the ECPA are indeed unconstitutional).
Where the district court invalidated the entire section of the Act, the Second Circuit Court
instead only partially invalidated certain sections and instilled its own procedural
safeguards:
[W]e need not invalidate the entirety of the nondisclosure requirement
of subsection 2709(c) or the judicial review provisions of subsection
3511(b). Although the conclusive presumption clause of subsections
3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) must be stricken, we invalidate subsection 2709(c)
and the remainder of subsection 3511(b) only to the extent that they
fail to provide for Government-initiated judicial review. The
Government can respond to this partial invalidation ruling by using
the suggested reciprocal notice procedure. With this procedure in
place, subsections 2709(c) and 3511(b) would survive First Amendment
challenge.
Id. at 884. After salvaging the statutory interpretations and partial invalidations, the
Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to give the Government an
opportunity to satisfy the newly outline constitutional standards for maintaining
disclosure. Id. at 885. Therefore, this case, and accordingly the judicial interpretations of
the statute are not yet over.
61
Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). NSLs “constitute a unique form of administrative
subpoena cloaked in secrecy and pertaining to national security issues. The statute bars all
NSL recipients from ever disclosing that the FBI has issued an NSL.” Id. See Adam Liptak,
Judge Voids F.B.I. Tool Granted By Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A18. A columnist
for the New York Times stated that the letters
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because they demanded a wide variety of information, were too broad,
and did not include a time limit for their sealed notice.62 While the
government appealed, Congress amended the pertinent statute—the
USA Patriot Act—and the judgment was vacated pursuant to the Act.63
Then, Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) brought
another action in Doe II, claiming that the Patriot Act as amended was
still unconstitutional.64
In Doe I, the Plaintiffs—Doe and the ACLU—challenged the Patriot
Act’s nondisclosure requirement.65 In response, Judge Marrero stated
allowed the F.B.I. not only to force communications companies,
including telephone and Internet providers, to turn over the records
without court authorization, but also to forbid the companies to tell the
customers or anyone else what they had done. Under the law, enacted
last year, the ability of the courts to review challenges to the ban on
disclosures was quite limited.
Id.
62
Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 511, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).
The Court holds only that such fundamental rights are certainly
implicated in some cases in which the Government may employ § 2709
broadly to gather information, thus requiring that the process
incorporate the safeguards of some judicial review to ensure that if an
infringement of those rights is asserted, they are adequately protected
through fair process in an independent neutral tribunal. Because the
[safeguard provisions] are wholly absent here, the Court finds on this
ground additional cause for invalidating § 2709 as applied.
Id. Furthermore, the court generally held that “compulsory, secret, and unreviewable
production of information required by the FBI’s application of 18 U.S.C. § 2709 violates the
Fourth Amendment, and that the non-disclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) violates
the First Amendment.” Id. at 526–27.
63
Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d at 385–86, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey
(Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008) (giving a brief overview of the Ashcroft (Doe I) holding
and the subsequent amendment of the USA Patriot Act).
64
Id. at 395–96. The district court was concerned with nondisclosure orders and
congressional violations, through the use of the statute, of fundamental principles of checks
and balances. Id.
65
Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 474–75, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey
(Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). The nondisclosure requirement
authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to compel
communications firms, such as internet service providers (“ISPs”) or
telephone companies, to produce certain customer records whenever
the FBI certifies that those records are “relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities.” The FBI's demands under § 2709 are issued in
the form of national security letters (“NSLs”), which constitute a
unique form of administrative subpoena cloaked in secrecy and
pertaining to national security issues. The statute bars all NSL
recipients from ever disclosing that the FBI has issued an NSL.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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that “[t]he statute fail[ed] constitutional strict scrutiny[] . . . because it
require[d] the court to blindly credit a finding that there ‘may’ be a
reason—potentially any conceivable and not patently frivolous reason—
for it to believe disclosure [would] result in a certain harm.”66 In Doe II,
when the case came before the court again in 2007, Judge Marrero held
for the second time that the use of the NSLs was unconstitutional
because it lacked procedural safeguards.67 Essentially, Judge Marrero’s
opinions reflected his discomfort about giving the FBI such broad
discretion without ensuring sufficient safeguards.68 The notion of e-mail
privacy is described somewhat superficially by more recent cases that
specifically address sections 2703 and 2705 of the SCA.69
3.

Current E-Mail Jurisprudence: Warshak I, Warshak II, and Allen

Few cases analyze the constitutionality of, or even discuss, sections
2703 and 2705 of the SCA. One case that does, however, is Warshak I.70
In Warshak I, the government obtained a court order directing Plaintiff
Steven Warshak’s (“Warshak”) ISP to turn over both Warshak’s e-mail
account information and the contents of his e-mails.71 The court issued
the order under seal, which, for ninety days, prohibited the ISP from
Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d at 418, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); see also http://news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.
pl?page=/andrews/bt/prv/20070925/20070925_doe.html. (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
67
Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F. Supp. 2d at 425, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe
III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “§ 2709(c) is unconstitutional under the First
Amendment because it functions as a licensing scheme that does not afford adequate
procedural safeguards[] . . .”).
68
Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475–76, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey
(Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008). Due to the fact that section 2709(c) prohibited
recipients of the NSLs from giving notice to anyone and that there was no provision
providing that the ban could be lifted, the section violated the Fourth Amendment because,
as applied, it barred or deterred judicial challenge. Id. See also Gonzalez (Doe II), 500 F.
Supp. 2d at 425, overruled in part by Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey (Doe III), 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir.
2008).
69
See infra Part II.B.3.
70
United States v. Warshak, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (Warshak I), vacated on other
grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified
by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). In Warshak I, the Defendant was suspected of mail fraud,
wire fraud, money laundering, and other related federal offenses. Id. at 460.
71
Id. The e-mail content requested also included e-mails which had been deleted from
storage for fewer than 181 days. Id. The government also requested copies of all log files
and backup tapes which were not pertinent to the point discussed at that time. Id.
Requesting e-mails that are more than 180 days old requires a lesser burden by the
government than e-mails which are equal to or fewer than 180 days old. See infra note 126
and accompanying text (discussing e-mail storage time frame provisions under Section
2703).
66
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notifying Warshak that the government had access to his records.72
However, more than one year after the order was granted, Plaintiff
Warshak still did not have notice of his e-mail seizure.73 Government
officials finally informed Warshak about the prior seizure one day after
the order was unsealed.74 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
then granted Warshak an injunction that barred the government from
seeking additional e-mails without providing notice to Warshak.75
Months later, the court vacated the injunction and scheduled an en banc
hearing to determine whether government agents had acted in good
faith when they requested the e-mails.76 Because the government had
72
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 460, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). This
ninety-day seal is permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B). Id.
73
Id. In Warshak I, the government admitted it had violated section 2703, and it did not
seek statutorily provided extensions for renewal of seal. Id. at 461 n.1.
74
Id. at 460–61.
75
Id. at 462.
76
Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741, 1 (6th Cir. Oct. 9,
2007) (en banc), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on
other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). Subsequently, in December 2007,
the district court allowed the presentation of the Nuvox e-mails as evidence. United States
v. Warshak, 2007 WL 4410237, *5 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), modified by 532 F.3d
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). As a result of Defendant’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion in
Warshak II, the court acknowledged that the government had the e-mails in its possession
before the delayed notice provision expired. Id. During this hearing the court did not rule
on the constitutionality of the SCA, and instead relied on the fact that the government held
the questionable e-mails at the proper time. Id. In July 2008, the court, sitting en banc,
ruled on Warshak for a third time. Warshak v. United States (Warshak III), 532 F.3d 521 (6th
Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the injunction prohibiting future ex
parte searches on the legal grounds that the issue was not ripe for adjudication. Id. at 526.
The judges split on the issue 9-5 with Judge Martin Jr., who had ruled on the initial
injunction in Warshak I, penning a stinging dissent. Id. at 534. Judge Martin Jr. accused the
majority of sidestepping the issue instead of reaching the question of whether the delayed
notice provision of the SCA is unconstitutional. Id. at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting). The
dissent further states, “Despite the fact that a violation of one of the bedrock principles of
the Bill of Rights has been alleged, today the majority has decided to treat the government
more favorably than a private litigant would be treated in a similar preliminary injunction
setting.” Id. at 537. The dissent accuses the majority of not only tilting the law in favor of
the government, but also disregarding mandatory precedent in the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 535.
Finally, the dissent ends its discussion by chastising the government’s investigatory
strength:
If it is free speech, freedom of religion, or the right to bear arms, we are
quick to strike down laws that curtail those freedoms. But if we are
discussing the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, heaven forbid that we should intrude on the
government’s investigatory province and actually require it to abide by the
mandates of the Bill of Rights. I can only imagine what our founding
fathers would think of this decision. If I were to tell James Otis and
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obtained the challenged e-mails before the delayed notice expired, the
court in Warshak II found that whether the SCA was constitutional
remained unanswered because the judgment in Warshak I had been
vacated.77 Warshak I and II show the difficulties that one district court
has had in deciding issues involving the SCA.
In addition, the court in Warshak I relied on United States v. Miller to
explain that the “reasonable relevance” standard was appropriate.78
Pursuant to this standard, government intrusion is less likely, and
furthermore, if a party demonstrates that a legitimate expectation of
privacy attaches to the seized records, the party has standing to dispute
the subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds.79
Ultimately, the court in Warshak II held that e-mail account holders
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.80 Privacy can be waived, but if
it is not, e-mails are private and protected from government intrusion
unless proper channels are used to demand access to them.81 The court
noted that the safeguards in place operate in the government’s favor,
namely the requirements of obtaining a warrant and notifying the

John Adams that a citizen’s private correspondence is now potentially
subject to ex parte and unannounced searches by the government
without a warrant supported by probable cause, what would they say?
Probably nothing, they would be left speechless.
Id. at 538 (first emphasis added).
77
See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing that the Warshak II court’s
vacation of the injunction against the e-mails was only due to the time issue). See also
Warshak II, 2007 WL 4410237 at *5, modified by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III)
(noting that the defendant’s reliance on Warshak I seems a bit misplaced due to the Sixth
Circuit vacating Warshak I’s judgment in Warshak II when the fate of 2703(d) was in limbo).
See infra Part III.C.3 (for a discussion of the delayed notice provision).
78
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 468–69, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) (citing
Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263–264 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 444 (1976)). The government argued that the court issued orders resembled subpoenas
rather than pure searches, and thus, the government did not need to show probable cause.
Id. at 468. If true, then the “reasonable relevance” standard suffices, and probable cause is
not necessary. Id.; see also United States v. Valdicieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d. 332, 340
(D. Puerto Rico 2007) (supporting the proposition that “probable cause for [a] search
warrant . . . need not be tantamount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt; probability is the
touchstone[]”).
79
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 468–69, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III)
(quoting Doe, 253 F.3d at 263–64; Miller, 425 U.S. at 444 (1976)).
80
Id. at 481–82.
81
Id. The court recognized the balancing of interests that needs to occur between those
interests of the accused, the government, and the public. Id. at 481.
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account holder that a warrant has been obtained.82 Such constitutional
safeguards protect individual interests and act as a roadblock and
prevent the government from depriving of an essential constitutional
right—the right to privacy.83 Last, even if a warrant or subpoena is used
to obtain e-mail records from an ISP, not all e-mails will fall within the
request because the scope of the request must be narrowly tailored to the
issue at hand.84

Id. at 481. The government still has the option to seize e-mails by obtaining a warrant,
notifying the account holder, or showing that the account holder has waived his
expectation of privacy. Id. Furthermore, section 2703(f) of the SCA allows the government
to require the ISP to preserve e-mails for evidentiary reasons, and the government may
obtain the e-mails from the receiving or sending party. Id.; see also Lawless, supra note 38
(discussing what constitutes third party material in relation to sending and receiving emails). Additionally, the court does not rule out that some e-mail account holders may
have lesser expectations of privacy due to heavy screening of e-mail. Warshak I, 490 F.3d at
478, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir.
Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on
other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). The difference is computer
generated screening and frequency:
[I]t is entirely possible, if not likely, that this process occurs without
ever having a human being read the content of subscribers’ e-mails.
Where total access is the norm, we hold that the government may
show as much and then may compel disclosure through the ISP. Less
in-depth screening, however, is insufficient to diminish the privacy
interest in an e-mail account.
Id.
83
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 481, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III)
(quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973)). The Warshak I court
further noted that “it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s
constitutional rights[.]” Id. at 481–82.
84
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 476 n.8, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). The
court claimed the following:
In neither instance is the government necessarily entitled to every email stored with the ISP, many of which are likely to be entirely
unrelated to its specific investigation. If the e-mails are seized
pursuant to a warrant, the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement would necessitate that the scope of the search somehow
be designed to target e-mails that could reasonably be believed to have
some connection to the alleged crime being investigated.
Id. And similarly, for subpoenas, “where a subpoena or an SCA order compels the
disclosure of e-mails, the demand must be reasonable in scope and relevance.” Id. (quoting
Doe, 253 F.3d at 263. Both requirements are fact specific. Id. (quoting United States v.
Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 365 (6th Cir. 2001)). The searches should be narrowed to the “sender,
recipient, date, relevant attachments, or keywords[]” and should be applied on a case by
case basis. Id.
82
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Next, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
further contributed to section 2703 jurisprudence by finding, in United
States v. Allen, that individuals hold no expectation of privacy in account
information provided to ISPs, but do hold an expectation of privacy in
the content of e-mails.85 The court found no privacy interest in the
information that the government had obtained from an Internet Access
Provider (“IAP”),86 Super Zippo, because the information consisted of
data the defendant gave to employees, websites the defendant visited
and no content from the defendant’s e-mail.87
The procedural issue in Allen resulted because the IAP handed over
the defendant’s information without first receiving a warrant from the
government as required by section 2703.88 The government’s agent had
asked Super Zippo whether it required a warrant to obtain the requested
information, and the general counsel for the IAP replied in the
negative.89 Therefore, because Super Zippo indicated that it did not
require a warrant, the government did not obtain one.90 The court in
Allen found that the government acted in good faith in light of the
agent’s behavior, and noted that there appeared to be no reason why the
evidence should not be admitted.91 Because the IAP did not demand a
warrant, no seizure existed; therefore, no constitutional violation
occurred.92 Thus, because the IAP willingly provided the requested
85
United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402 (C.A.A.F. 2000). In Allen, appellant’s conviction
consisted of anal sodomy, assault, conduct unbecoming of an officer, transporting and
receiving child pornography, and soliciting his wife as a prostitute. Id. at 403–04. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld the general court martial. Id.
at 410. The court distinguishes itself from Maxwell, which prohibited access to contents of
e-mails, by holding that Allen does not concern itself with communication at all and instead
concerns itself with stored transactions that are recorded in a log format without
accompanying text. Id. at 409.
86
See supra Part II.A (discussing the synonymy of IAPs and ISPs).
87
Allen, 53 M.J. at 409. Super Zippo, defendant’s IAP, handed over a log to the
government that “identif[ied] the date, time, user, and detailed internet [sic] address of
sites accessed by appellant over several months.” Id. at 409. The court reasoned that this
information was covered by Title II of the ECPA because the list of websites did not
constitute protected content as required under § 2703(c)(1)(A) in order to be protected. Id.
88
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006). Section 2703(c) regulates access to subscriber information.
Id. In addition to a warrant, the government may obtain subscriber information by
obtaining a court order, consent of the subscriber, or formal written request from a law
enforcement agency concerning fraudulent allegations. Id.
89
Allen, 53 M.J. at 409.
90
Id.
91
Id. The court in Allen determined that if a warrant had been issued, the evidence
would be admissible and, therefore, should be admitted because the government agent
relied in good faith on the representation of Super Zippo’s legal counsel. Id.
92
Id. at 409–10. Justice Sullivan in his concurrence noted that “the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act does not require suppression for failure to comply with its
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information, the court dismissed the section 2703 challenge in Allen, and
the constitutionality question was once again avoided.93
4.

False Notions of E-Mail Privacy

Applying this historical jurisprudence today, most courts, as in the
cases discussed above, have held that most private-party e-mail
provisions, absent a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. (Sullivan, J. concurring). See
United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2007). Additionally, a recent case from
the D.C. District Court recognized § 2703 of the SCA as unconstitutional for its lack of an
exclusionary provision. Id. In Ferguson, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
suspected that the defendant was involved in drug trafficking, and it launched an
investigation. Id. at 8. The government submitted, and the magistrate approved, two ex
parte applications that compelled MSN and Yahoo! to hand over to government officials
the e-mails of the defendant that were more than 180 days old. Id. The defendant
requested to suppress the evidence and alleged that the SCA was unconstitutional because
it lacked a suppression remedy. Id. This judicial opinion is less than two pages long and is
not clear in its reasoning, but suggests that Warshak I previously declared the SCA to be
unconstitutional. See id. See also Warshak I, 490 F.3d 455, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007),
modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III). This interpretation is mistaken because Warshak I
upheld the SCA and narrowly construed the injunction granted to exclude possible
unconstitutional provisions regarding a facial challenge that had nothing to do with the
lack of an exclusionary remedy. See id. See also Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 9. In Ferguson,
the court found that the government reasonably relied on the SCA because Acts of
Congress are “entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality[]” and because until
2006 in Warshak I, no court had ruled the SCA unconstitutional since its enactment in 1986.
Id. Therefore, in 2003, when the government applied for SCA orders in this case, there was
no indication that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. Because the government complied
with SCA’s standards, the court allowed the evidence. Id. Furthermore, the court held that
“the Government’s reliance on the SCA was objectively reasonable. Thus, the Court need
not consider the constitutionality of the SCA.” Id. Oddly enough, two short paragraphs
later, the court cited Smith, one lonely case that stated that “‘the Stored Communications
Act does not provide an exclusion remedy. It allows for civil damages . . . and criminal
punishment . . . but nothing more.’” Id. at 10 (quoting United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d
1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original). Thus, the question remains as to whether
the lack of an exclusion remedy renders the entire SCA unconstitutional. See id.
93
Allen, 53 M.J. at 409. In Allen, the court noted that suppression is not a remedy under
the SCA, but that courts need to determine whether the accused (the individual whose
account holder information was seized) had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. Also,
the SCA “does not require suppression for failure to comply with its provisions, absent a
violation of a constitutional right.” Id. at 410 (Sullivan, J. concurring). This reasoning leads
one to believe that courts recognize that suppression is guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment but not under the SCA unless there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. See
also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 422–23 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (barring electronic
evidence that was illegally obtained and classified as fruit from the poisonous tree);
Lawless, supra note 38, at 1 (stating that “[a]gainst the backdrop of this increased use of
Internet search records used as criminal evidence, there is a corresponding void in privacy
law: there is no applicable statutory suppression remedy[]”).
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correspondence is private, and thus constitutionally protected, because
the user expects the content to be private.94 Furthermore, e-mail is one of
the most popular mediums for communication, similar to telephones and
letters in the past.95 ISPs house today’s virtual mailboxes.96 Even if an
94
Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007
U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13,
2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
95
Id.
The court analogized the constitutional protections given to telephone
conversation content in Katz and found that those same protections should apply to e-mail.
Id. In addition, the Senate Report acknowledged that computers are becoming the
exclusive medium for communication and record keeping:
The Committee also recognizes that computers are used extensively
today for the storage and processing of information. With the advent
of computerized recordkeeping systems, Americans have lost the
ability to lock away a great deal of personal and business information.
For example, physicians and hospitals maintain medical files in offsite
data banks, businesses of all sizes transmit their records to remote
computers to obtain sophisticated data processing services. These
services as well as the providers of electronic mail create electronic
copies of private correspondence for later reference. This information
is processed for the benefit of the user but often it is maintained for
approximately 3 months to ensure system integrity. For the person or
business whose records are involved, the privacy or proprietary
interest in that information should not change.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986). The Report further acknowledged that the law prior to the
ECPA would likely not protect the above mentioned records and that the purpose of the
ECPA was to remedy this situation. Id. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 27, Warshak v.
United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007). Additionally, e-mail is granted the same
privacy rights as sealed containers. Id. “In recent years, email has become the preferred
medium of written communication for millions of Americans, revolutionizing the form in
which individuals communicate to each other their thoughts, ideas, beliefs, hopes, dreams,
and fears and becoming the backbone of the country’s communication system.” Id.
Furthermore, “Emails are ‘closed containers’ which may not be searched without a
warrant.” Id. at 29. The Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief in Warshak I continued by explaining
how e-mails are similar to closed containers. Id. at 30–31.
96
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 27, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan.
11, 2007). In his final brief, Warshak argued as follows:
Emails stored on an ISP’s server are a form of closed container. The
contents of an email are not visible to the naked eye; instead, several
intrusive searches must occur before the contents may be read. One
seeking to view the contents of an ISP-stored email must first gain
access to that portion of the ISP’s server that houses the subscriber’s
email; this is a search in and of itself. Even after one gains access to the
a [sic] subscriber’s virtual mailbox, the content of those emails remain
[sic] shielded from public view, much like the content of letters sitting
in a “real” mailbox. To view the contents of an email, another
physically intrusive act is necessary: the email must be unsealed
through the operation of a computer function such as clicking on the
email using a mouse or using the computer’s “open” function, an act
doctrinally indistinguishable from the act of opening a sealed letter or
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ISP contracts for a right to access a user’s e-mail “in the ordinary course
of business,” this access does not waive a user’s expectation of privacy.97
Therefore, in light of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts will
likely continue to hold that individuals have an expectation of privacy
regarding their e-mail.98
Courts have discussed account holder
expectations in more detail with regard to server policies.
5.

Reasonable v. Unreasonable Expectations: Marking the Bounds

Two cases decided by the United States Courts of Appeals,
regarding the impact of Fourth Amendment expectations of e-mail
privacy in view of school or organizational server policies, merit brief

package or unlocking a closed footlocker. [Therefore], ISP-stored
emails are entitled to protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . .
Id. at *30–31 (internal citation omitted). See Dempsey, supra note 26, at 421. Dempsey also
used the storage locker analogy: “[w]hen an individual stores personal property with a
third party, the owner of the property retains a privacy interest in the stored items,
meaning that a warrant would be required to search the storage space.” Id. See Robert M.
Goldstein & Martin G. Weinberg, The Stored Communications Act and Private E-mail
Communications, CHAMPION, Aug. 2007, at 19–20. Finally, Warshak’s attorneys authored an
article discussing the SCA, and drew an interesting conclusion when comparing sealed
containers, letters, and e-mails. Id. The authors described an e-mail as having more
privacy aspects than a traditional letter because
the owner of the e-mail can repossess a read-and-then-closed e-mail at
any moment, without any notice or permission from the ISP. The
owner of the e-mail can delete it from the mailbox, or do whatever he
or she wants to do with the e-mail. It is, for all purposes, in that
person’s possession, dominion, and control at all times. Consequently,
if there is any difference, the privacy interests should be greater in the
context of e-mail than in the traditional carrier paradigm[] . . . .
Id.
97
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). See supra note 29 (discussing the facts
of Miller). See also United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Miller
requires that access to a user’s e-mail must occur in the ordinary course of business and
where university policies that provide for limited e-mail monitoring do not satisfy the
ordinary course of business requirement. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d
at 1147. See also Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473–74, vacated on other grounds en banc by No. 064092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D.
OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008)
(Warshak III). Essentially, where user contracts for e-mail and ISP policies are in place,
unless those contracts and policies allow greater than limited access and the government
can prove that regular monitoring occurs, policies will be ineffective in proving that
content is scanned by persons in the ordinary course of business. Id.
98
See JOHNSON, supra note 18 (demonstrating that even lawyers recognize privacy of email correspondence and how it can help in assisting clients). Johnson stated that, for
practical purposes, “e-mail should be considered as secure as many other common means
of communication, such as phone calls, faxes, the U.S. mail, and express delivery services.”
Id. at xvii.
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attention.99 Exemplifying the two extremes that mark the constitutional
bounds for obtaining e-mails, United States v. Simons and United States v.
Heckenkamp, discuss expected privacy interests of server users.100
In Simons, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a
Foreign Bureau of Information Services (“FBIS”) engineer had no
reasonable expectation of privacy on a work computer because the
agency had a policy that allowed auditing of work computers and had
notified the engineer of this policy.101 The court determined that the
policy eliminated the engineer’s reasonable expectation of privacy.102
According to the court, whether Plaintiff Mark Simons believed he was
entitled to privacy was not relevant because the FBIS’s policy objectively
forewarned him that he was not.103 The Simons court was one of the first

See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000); Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392; Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142. See 41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra
note 1, § 13. An e-mail policy “should be clear, concise, and aimed at responsible use of email, in order to gain acceptance throughout the company. The policy should be consistent
with other company policies, such as access to and use of company facilities and property.”
Id.
101
Simons, 206 F.3d at 398. The FBIS policy explained that FBIS would conduct electronic
audits according to the following guidelines to ensure compliance with its internet usage
policy:
Audits. Electronic auditing shall be implemented within all FBIS
unclassified networks that connect to the Internet or other publicly
accessible networks to support identification, termination, and
prosecution of unauthorized activity.
These electronic audit
mechanisms shall . . . be capable of recording:
•
Access to the system, including successful and failed login
attempts, and logouts;
•
Inbound and outbound file transfers;
•
Terminal connections (telnet) to and from external systems;
•
Sent and received e-mail messages;
•
Web sites visited, including uniform resource locator (URL)
of pages retrieved;
•
Date, Time, and user associated with each event.
Id. at 395–96. The policy also informed users that FBIS would periodically “audit, inspect,
and/or monitor” user accounts when it deemed proper. Id. at 396. Defendant Simons’s
account fell under suspicion when a network manager noticed a number of hits for the
word “sex” originating from Simons’s computer. Id. Further investigation led FBIS to find
that the websites that Simons visited contained nude pictures and that he had saved over
one-thousand of such pictures and files on his computer. Id.
102
Id. at 398. “We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate
his Fourth Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet.” Id.
103
Id. “[R]egardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred
from the Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable after FBIS
notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use.” Id. (citing Am. Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Service, 871 F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1989)).
99

100

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/6

Cuccia: Have You Seen My Inbox? Government Oversteps the Fourth Amendment

2009]

E-Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment

697

to examine employer e-mail privacy policies.104 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit has ruled that organizational server policies do not negate an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.105
In Heckenkamp, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
attaching one’s computer to the University of Wisconsin’s network did
not waive a user’s reasonable expectation of privacy.106 Indeed,
Heckenkamp illuminated the need for section 2703 of the SCA.107 In
Heckenkamp, immediately after the University of Wisconsin determined
that a student had misused the computer she had attached to the school’s
network, school officials disconnected the student’s computer from the
network and confiscated it without a warrant.108 The Heckenkamp court
distinguished the facts in Heckenkamp from those in Simons because, in
Heckenkamp, the University of Wisconsin did not have an announced
screening or monitoring policy in effect, and, in fact, the server policy
that was in place led users to believe that their accounts were private.109
Therefore, as shown by the divergent outcomes in Simons and
Heckenkamp, an organization’s internet server policy may not effectively
Id. at 392. See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007). The other
extreme is exhibited in the Ninth Circuit by Heckenkamp. Id.
105
Id. at 1147. The court held that there is no single factor that establishes that a place is
free from warrantless government intrusion. Id. at 1146. However, the court noted that
people generally have a heightened expectation of privacy on their home computers and in
their password protected files. Id.
A person’s reasonable expectation of privacy may be diminished in
“transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that have [sic] already
arrived at the recipient.” However, the mere act of accessing a
network does not in itself extinguish privacy expectations, nor does the
fact that others may have occasional access to the computer.
Id. at 1146–47 (quoting United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004)) (internal
citations omitted).
106
Id. at 1146.
107
Id. In Heckenkamp, a University of Wisconsin student hacked into the main computer
network and gained access to the university e-mail system. Id. at 1143. The student had
been fired from the school’s computer help desk for “similar unauthorized activity,” which
in turn justified the administrator’s concern that Defendant Heckenkamp had the
knowledge to actually cause harm. Id. at 1144. Since this happened during the period of
final examinations, the university’s computer network investigator noted that a disruption
to the university would be “tremendous if e-mail was destroyed.” Id.
108
Id. at 1145.
109
Id. at 1147. The school policy required that
“[i]n general, all computer and electronic files should be free from
access by any but the authorized users of those files. Exceptions to this
basic principle shall be kept to a minimum and made only where
essential to . . . protect the integrity of the University and the rights
and property of the state.”
Id. (alterations in original). The school’s policy in Heckenkamp, therefore, actually gave the
user a heightened expectation of privacy. Id.
104
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eliminate the expectations of privacy that individuals have when
accessing an organization’s server.110
Laws governing electronic communications under the SCA
specifically regulate e-mail evidentiary procedures with respect to third
party ISPs.111
This Note addresses the likely occurrence of an
unconstitutional search and seizure pursuant to sections 2703, 2704, and
2705 of the SCA.
C. Sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the Stored Communications Act112
The SCA, which, as mentioned previously is also known as Title II of
the ECPA, provides the government power with which it can access
customer communication records from third-party service providers.113
In 1986, Congress enacted the following Titles of the ECPA: Title I
applies to “interception of communications and related matters”;114 Title
II relates to “stored wire and electronic communications and
transactional records access”;115 and Title III discusses “pen registers.”116
110
Simons, 206 F.3d at 398–99; Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1147. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit explained in Simons that the FBIS’s Internet policy diminished Simons’s
legitimate expectation of privacy. 206 F.3d at 398–99. Additionally, Simons never asserted
that he was unaware of the Internet policy. Id. at 399 n.8. Conversely, in Heckenkamp, even
though a policy existed and stated that certain users may access his account, University
policies considered, in their entirety, did not diminish Heckenkamp’s legitimate
expectation of privacy. 482 F.3d at 1147.
111
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2521, 2701–12, 3117, 3121–
27 (2006).
112
See The ECPA, ISPs & Obtaining E-mail: A Primer for Local Prosecutors, APRI, July
2005, at 25, available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ecpa_isps_obtaining_email_05.pdf.
Two threshold questions when evaluating anything under the ECPA are as follows: one,
“Does the provider offer e-mail services to the public?”; and two, “Is the law enforcement
agency seeking e-mail content?” Id.
113
Id. at 9. The ECPA does not define governmental entities and neither have courts. Id.
114
H.R. 4952, 99th Cong. § 1 (1986). The purpose of the ECPA was to
amend[] title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968—the Federal wiretap law—to protect against the unauthorized
interception of electronic communications. The bill amends the 1968
law to update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in
light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications
technologies.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986). See also THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY,
CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO PAPERS, RECORDS, AND COMMUNICATIONS:
WHAT INFORMATION CAN THE GOVERNMENT GET ABOUT YOU, AND HOW CAN THEY GET IT?
(2006), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/govaccess/govaccesschart.pdf; http://www.cdt.org
/wiretap/govaccess/govaccesschart-11x17.pdf (presenting more information about
current legal standards, regarding access to papers, records, and communications, and
presenting two charts mapping accessibility of documents, burdens, and levels of privacy
protection).
115
H.R. 4952.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/6

Cuccia: Have You Seen My Inbox? Government Oversteps the Fourth Amendment

2009]

E-Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment

699

This Note specifically addresses Title II, which attempts to balance the
privacy interests of both citizens and law enforcement agencies.117 The
purpose of the SCA was to update existing wiretapping law to account
for new forms of communications, such as e-mail.118 Two sections of the
SCA were recently subjects of litigation in district courts because of the
provisions that address lack of notice and delayed notice when gathering
the contents of e-mails.119 Parts II.C.1–2 discuss these sections of the
SCA.120
1.

Section 2703: Required Disclosure of Customer Communications or
Records121

Section 2703 of the SCA governs disclosure of customer
communications and records.122
Section 2703 provides that the
government may obtain general account holder information123 via

Id.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1. See Robert S. Steere, Keeping “Private E-mail” Private: A
Proposal to Modify the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 264–74
(1998) (Titles I and II of the ECPA should be clarified because of the very fine distinctions
between stored communications and transit communications). See also Pikowsky, supra note
11. Another proposed solution arguing for clarification has been to address all
communications—telephone, postal mail, e-mail—in one statute, and therefore provide
consistency and incorporate emerging technologies at the same time. Id. (stating that “the
statutes should be amended to provide the same protection against surreptitious access to
stored communications, regardless of whether that communication is stored in a person’s
mailbox at an Internet Service Provider, in a personal computer located in a house, or in a
file cabinet in an office[]”).
118
132 CONG. REC. 4039 (1986).
119
See Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other
grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified
by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d
521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III); United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2007).
120
See infra Parts II.C.1–3 (discussing the sections of the SCA governing disclosure of email by third party service providers, backup preservation, and delayed notice to account
holders).
121
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
122
Id. (noting that section 2703 of the SCA is titled, “Required disclosure of customer
communications or records”).
123
Id. § 2703(c)(2). Such general account information held by remote electronic
computing services that must be disclosed to a governmental entity includes
(A) name;
(B) address;
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session
times and durations;
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity,
including any temporarily assigned network address; and
116
117
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warrant, court order, consent of the subscriber or customer, submission
of a formal request by the governmental entity investigating, or
administrative subpoena.124 Furthermore, the government may obtain
the actual content of e-mail communication with or without providing
notice to the subscriber.125 Section 2703 distinguishes between e-mails
that are more than 180 days old and those that are equal to and less than
180 days old, the latter being harder to obtain.126 The governmental
(F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or
bank account number)[.]
Id.
Id. § 2703(c)(1). The SCA specifically states that information may be obtained when
the governmental entity
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under
investigation or equivalent State warrant;
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure;
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation
concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place of business of a
subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer is
engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325 of this title); or
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).
Id. § 2703(c)(1). The information may be obtained under § 2703(c)(2) “of a subscriber to or
customer of such service when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena
authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial
subpoena . . . .” Id. § 2703(c)(2). See H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007); infra note 146. A bill is
currently before Congress that will allow the governmental entity to obtain information
while investigating the disappearance of a subscriber when the subscriber is either a minor,
or if there is likely to be suffering and a guardian, spouse, or parent has consented. H.R.
3156, 110th Cong. (2007); infra note 146 (text of proposed bill).
125
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
126
Id. § 2703(a)–(b). The statute reads:
(a) Contents of Wire of Electronic Communications in Electronic
Storage.—A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire
or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or
less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction
over the offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant. A
governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or
electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and
eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in a Remote
Computing Service.—(1) A governmental entity may require a
provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of any
wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is made
applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection—
124
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entity seeking the information may obtain the contents of wire or
electronic communication without notice if it obtains a warrant.127
Furthermore, the government may obtain information with prior notice
by an administrative subpoena or court order.128 Legal theorists and
courts have questioned the constitutionality of administrative subpoenas
and court orders, claiming that they do not satisfy the probable cause
standard required by the Fourth Amendment.129
Administrative
subpoenas require only a reasonable relevance standard, whereas actual
warrants require a showing of probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment.130 Although legal theorists and courts have exhausted this
issue, this Note narrows its focus to the unconstitutional disparity of
existing safeguards for e-mail privacy and the likelihood that Fourth
Amendment violations will occur.131
(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the
governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation
or equivalent State warrant; or
(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the
subscriber or customer if the governmental entity—
(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal
or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial
subpoena; or
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection
(d) of this section; except that delayed notice may be given
pursuant to section 2705 of this title.
Id. It has been suggested that it “makes no sense” to distinguish between e-mails greater or
less than 180 days old because all e-mails should be treated the same. Final Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellee at 42 n.18, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007);
see also infra notes 208−13 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Plaintiff Warshak argued:
A year-old email is no less worthy of Fourth Amendment protection
than is a day-old one, and permitting the seizure of a 181-day old
email via §2703 orders or subpoenas but requiring a warrant based on
probable cause for a 179-day old one is a distinction without
constitutional foundation or principle.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 42 n.18, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 11,
2007).
127
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. The warrant must be issued pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure “by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under
investigation or equivalent State warrant.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
128
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b); supra note 126.
129
See Steinberg, supra note 9, at 478 (noting that court orders require “far less rigorous
proof than the probable cause standard for a Fourth Amendment warrant[]”). See also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
130
Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263–64 (6th Cir. 2001); see also supra note 78
(discussing the reasonable relevance test).
131
See Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007),
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Section 2704: Backup Preservation132

The SCA provides the government with a security blanket in section
2704 by requiring ISPs to backup user accounts when the government
makes such a request.133 This provides the government with an excellent
opportunity to secure evidence because backup preservation pursuant to
section 2703(b)(2) does not require the government to provide the user
with immediate notice.134 Therefore, the government may, without
notifying the account holder, have the ISP backup the account until the

modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III) (noting that the government typically argues that
court orders issued under section 2703 of the SCA are akin to subpoenas, which require
only a showing of reasonable relevance). See also Doe, 253 F.3d at 263–64. The
reasonableness standard is applied to subpoenas, whereas actual warrants require a
showing of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Id. A warrant can be
distinguished from a subpoena by the level of intrusiveness of the seizure. Id. at 264.
Whereas a warrant is classified to have immediate intrusiveness, an order or administrative
subpoena may be contested in federal court through a motion to suppress, thereby being
less intrusive. Id. See also Paul K. Ohm, Parallel-Effect Statutes and E-mail “Warrants”:
Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1610–11 (2004). Ohm
contended that there is a growing chasm between privacy and freedom. Id. at 1599.
Furthermore, he predicted that lowering the standards the government has to meet to
obtain a SCA warrant may simultaneously lower the standards for obtaining physical
search warrants as well. Id. at 1613. Evidence suggests that Ohm’s prediction is true in
situations where warrants may be served via fax to the ISP, and then the ISP performs the
search without supervision of a police officer. Id. at 1610–11. Ohm stated that these
warrants granting unsupervised searches are not search warrants at all, and the problem
arises where the accused does not even know that his inbox has been searched. Id. See 18
U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1). All the government needs to do is contact the ISP with the account
information that it wants backed up and the ISP must comply with the government’s
request within two business days. Id. See id. § 2704(a)(4). Then, fourteen days after notice
to the subscriber, the government may obtain access to the backed up copy if the subscriber
has neither objected nor initiated proceedings against the government. Id. § 2704(a)(5). To
satisfy its burden to justify e-mail back-up, the government must only demonstrate that it
has a reason to believe that notification to the subscriber will result in destruction of emails; if it shows this, the backup preservation shall be authorized. Id. See id. § 2704(b)(1)–
(5). The SCA grants proper remedies to subscribers in cases where subscribers may file a
motion to vacate or quash subpoena. Id. Section 2704(b) of the SCA explicitly establishes
procedures for challenging a backup and provides instructions for judges concerning when
to grant and deny such motions. Id.
132
18 U.S.C. § 2704.
133
Id. “A governmental entity . . . may include in its subpoena or court order a
requirement that the service provider to whom the request is directed create a backup copy
of the contents of the electronic communications sought in order to preserve those
communications.” Id. § 2704(a)(1).
134
Id. § 2704. “Without notifying the subscriber or customer . . . such service provider
shall create such backup copy as soon as practicable consistent with its regular business
practices and shall confirm to the governmental entity that such backup copy has been
made.” Id. § 2704(a)(1).
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government can meet its burden to show cause for obtaining the
contents.135 Notice is provided to the account holder at the government’s
discretion because the delayed notice provision of section 2705 applies to
backup preservation.136 This Note examines delayed notice, one of the
open-ended provisions of the SCA that can easily violate Fourth
Amendment guarantees of privacy.137
3.

Section 2705: Delayed Notice

Rules almost always come with exceptions, and section 2703 is not
unique in this respect. Specifically, section 2703 states that when the
government requests an account holder’s information from an ISP, the
government must notify the account holder of the request, but section
2703 also stipulates that this notice may be delayed for e-mail content
gained by an administrative subpoena or court order.138
This
problematic exception is defined in section 2705, which provides that the
government may elect to delay notification to the account holder for up
to ninety days.139 Furthermore, this delayed notice of ninety days may
be continuously extended in ninety day increments if the government

Id.
Id. § 2704(a)(2). The government has three days to notify the subscriber after backup
is confirmed by the ISP under section 2704. Id. However, the government can choose to
use the delayed notice provision and then notice can be technically delayed for extended
amounts of time. Id. § 2705. See infra note 140 (citing to the SCA provision extending
delayed notice length—section 2705(a)).
137
See infra Part III.C.3.
138
See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2006).
139
See supra note 126 (citing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)). See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a).
Section 2703 provides as follows:
(1) A governmental entity acting under section 2703(b) of this title
may—
(A) where a court order is sought, include in the application a
request, which the court shall grant, for an order delaying the
notification required under section 2703(b) of this title for a period
not to exceed ninety days, if the court determines that there is
reason to believe that notification of the existence of the court order
may have an adverse result described in paragraph (2) of this
subsection; or
(B) where an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or
State statute or a Federal or State grand jury subpoena is obtained,
delay the notification required under section 2703(b) of this title for
a period not to exceed ninety days upon the execution of a written
certification of a supervisory official that there is reason to believe
that notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an
adverse result described in paragraph (2) of this subsection.
Id.
135
136
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submits the proper request for the court to grant such exception.140
Therefore, theoretically, if continuous extensions are granted, the
government may lawfully obtain the content of an individual’s e-mail
without any notification to that individual for an unlimited amount of
time.141 The drafters of section 2705 of the SCA claim that the only time
this scenario could possibly take place is when an “adverse effect” is
likely.142 Consequently, this delay provision leaves open the possibility
that individuals do not have the opportunity to refute seizures that may
be unlawful before Fourth Amendment violations occur.143 Congress has
140
18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(4). This delayed notice exception specifically provides that
“[e]xtensions of the delay of notification provided in section 2703 of up to ninety days each
may be granted by the court upon application, or by certification by a governmental entity,
but only in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.” Id. See id. 2705(a)(5). Upon
expiration of the extension, the government must inform the subscriber of specific
investigation details. Id. Section 2705(a)(5) specifically states:
Upon expiration of the period of delay of notification under paragraph
(1) or (4) of this subsection, the governmental entity shall serve upon,
or deliver by registered or first-class mail to, the customer or
subscriber a copy of the process or request together with notice that—
(A) states with reasonable specificity the nature of the law
enforcement inquiry; and
(B) informs such customer or subscriber—
(i) that information maintained for such customer or
subscriber by the service provider named in such process
or request was supplied to or requested by that
governmental authority and the date on which the
supplying or request took place;
(ii) that notification of such customer or subscriber was
delayed;
(iii) what governmental entity or court made the
certification or determination pursuant to which that
delay was made; and
(iv) which provision of this chapter allowed such delay.
Id.
141
Id. § 2705(a)(4) (granting continuous extensions).
142
Id. § 2705(a)(2). The SCA defines adverse effect as “(A) endangering the life or
physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of or
tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously
jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.” Id.
143
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 44, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan.
11, 2007). See infra text accompanying note 172 (acknowledging the problem with delayed
notice). Warshak’s brief discussed
[T]he unconstitutional synergy of §§2703(b)(1)(B)(ii), 2703(d), and 2705,
which, in conjunction, allow the government to secretly seize and
search the entirety of an individuals’ private email correspondence and
to affirmatively prevent the individual from learning of the intrusion at
a point at which he could lodge a judicial challenge in advance of the
seizure. In the administrative/grand jury subpoena context, while
notice to the target of the subpoena may not be required by the Fourth
Amendment, the fact remains that, where, as is often the case, the
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proposed an amendment to the SCA; however, the proposed
amendment attempts to “clarify [only] ongoing scope[s] . . . and
warrants,” but fails to address delayed notice or the lack of supervised
seizures.144
4.

Congress’s Proposed Amendment

On July 24, 2007, just over one month after the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit decided Warshak I, Congress proposed a bill intended to
revamp section 2703 of the SCA.145 Essentially, the important proposed
changes include further defining the circumstances in which a
governmental entity may require an ISP to divulge account information
and clarifying the appropriate circumstances that lend themselves to
requirements for a warrant and court order.146 As discussed previously,
target learns of the subpoena, he has the ability to move to quash it. In
the §2703 context, however, notice to the account holder is prohibited,
thus affirmatively denying him any chance to protect his rights in
advance of disclosure.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 44.
144
H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007).
145
Id. The bill proposed by Congress to amend the SCA is currently before the House
subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Id. See Warshak v. United
States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds en banc by No.
06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), modified by 2007 WL 4410237
(S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008)
(Warshak III) (granting Plaintiff injunction barring government from seeking any further emails without notice to Plaintiff).
146
H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007). The proposed bill reads:
‘(h)(1) In General- A court order under subsection (d) or a warrant
under subsection (c)(1)(A) may require that records or other
information (not including the contents of communications) be
disclosed to a governmental entity on an ongoing basis.
‘(2) Standard- The court shall issue an order or warrant
requiring such ongoing disclosure if-‘(A) in the case of a court order under subsection (d), the
court finds that the application contains specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the records or other information (not
including the contents of communications) will be relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation; or
‘(B) in the case of a warrant under subsection (c)(1)(A), the
court finds that probable cause supports issuing the warrant.
‘(3) Duration- An order or warrant requiring ongoing disclosure
under this subsection may require ongoing disclosure for a
period not to exceed 60 days. Extensions of such an order or
warrant may be granted, but only upon an application for an
extension under this subsection and upon the judicial
finding required by paragraph (2). The period of extension
shall be for a period not to exceed 60 days.
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‘(4) Nondisclosure- An order or warrant requiring ongoing
disclosure under this subsection shall direct that-‘(A) the order or warrant be sealed until otherwise ordered
by the court; and
‘(B) the person or entity who is obligated by the order or
warrant to disclose records or other information on an
ongoing basis to the applicant shall not disclose the existence
of the order or warrant or the existence of the investigation
to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered by the
court.
‘(5) Scope and Assistance‘(A) IN GENERAL- An order or warrant requiring ongoing
disclosure under this subsection, upon service of that order
or warrant, shall apply to any person or entity providing
wire or electronic communication service or remote
computing service in the United States whose assistance
may facilitate the execution of the order or warrant.
Whenever such an order or warrant is served on any person
or entity not specifically named in the order or warrant,
upon request of such person or entity, the attorney for the
Government or law enforcement or investigative officer that
is serving the order or warrant shall provide written or
electronic certification that the order or warrant applies to
the person or entity being served.
‘(B) INFORMATION PROVIDED- Upon the request of an
attorney for the Government or an officer of a law
enforcement agency authorized to receive the results of an
order or warrant requiring ongoing disclosure under this
subsection, a provider of a wire or electronic communication
service or a provider of remote computing services shall
furnish such investigative or law enforcement officer all
information, facilities, technical, and other assistance
including execution of such warrant or order unobtrusively
and with no more interference with the services that the
person so ordered by the court accords the party with
respect to whom the warrant or order pertains than is
necessary to effect the disclosure required under the warrant
or order, if such installation and assistance is directed by a
court. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, records or
other information disclosed under such warrant or order
shall be furnished to the officer of a law enforcement agency
designated in the court order, at reasonable intervals during
regular business hours for the duration of the order.
Pursuant to section 2522, an order may be issued to enforce
the assistance capability and capacity requirements under
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.
‘(6) Nonexclusivity- Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a
governmental entity from requiring or receiving the
production on an ongoing basis of records or other
information (not including the contents of communications)
with consent of the subscriber or user, or under any other
lawful authority.’
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courts have addressed the warrant/court order issue relating to whether
the probable cause standard is met under the Fourth Amendment over
and over, and Congress’s proposed amendment could cure this problem.
Courts have not yet decided whether sections 2703 and 2705 of the
SCA are unconstitutional in view of their provisions for renewed
delayed notice and lessened evidentiary burdens compounded by
section 2704’s backup requirement. Keeping this in mind, Part III
analyzes current safeguards in place for disclosure and backup as
described in sections 2703 and 2704 to protect both the government and
the subscribers, and Part IV suggests the proper approach for tailoring
both these safeguards and section 2705 to achieve an outcome that
complies with the Fourth Amendment.
III. ANALYSIS OF STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT AS APPLIED TO
GOVERNMENT REQUESTS FOR E-MAIL
The question is not what the statute authorizes, but what the Constitution
requires.147
The United States Constitution requires lawmakers to pass statutes
that fall within legitimate, constitutional parameters. The transition of
stored data from home computers and filing cabinets to Internet
databases, including ISPs, should not mitigate individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights.148 As one scholar pointed out,
Over 200 years ago, the founders of our country took
strong steps to permanently and finally end the
authority of the government to conduct wholesale
surveillance [on] the private communications and
thoughts [of] ordinary Americans. The question for us
today is whether we’re going to give up on that

....
H.R. 3156, 110th Cong. (2007) (setting forth proposed amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2703).
147
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 41, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan.
11, 2007).
148
Jonathan Zittrain, Search and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. FORUM
83, 90 (2005) (discussing the current trend to store data with “faraway third parties” and
noting that this “should not entail a complete stripping of Fourth Amendment interests in
having that data secure from unreasonable government intrusion[]”).
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American ideal, or whether we’re going to take the steps
necessary to return to it.149
The decisions of Katz and Smith provide the foundation for
evaluating electronic communications.150 Because e-mail evidentiary
issues are analogous to telephone calls and e-mails likely retain an even
higher expectation of privacy than telephone communications because emails are more similar to written letters, heightened privacy protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment should apply to e-mails.151
Part III.A analyzes the constitutional problems presented by sections
2703, 2704, and 2705 by focusing on the overwhelming power granted to
the government and the comparatively minimal protection against
privacy invasion provided to e-mail account holders.152 Next, Part III.B
examines the current jurisprudential trend to veer away from
interpreting the SCA, focusing on decisions by United States district
courts that have interpreted the SCA in the context of e-mail seizure
problems.153 The fundamental question presented, then, is whether the
SCA, including Congress’s proposed amendment to the SCA, provides
so much power to the government that individual account holders’
Fourth Amendment rights to privacy are violated.
A. A Perfect Storm: Fourth Amendment Violations Presented by Sections
2703 and 2705
The expectation of privacy that individuals believe they have when
typing an e-mail and saving it as a draft or sending it to a recipient may
be easily violated, considering the overwhelming number of provisions
in the SCA that allows the government to override an individual’s right
to privacy in e-mails.154 E-mail has become the preferred medium of
See Snyder, supra note 10 (“[A]side from the technology, the government’s ongoing
violation of fundamental civil liberties would have been very familiar to the men who
gathered in 1791 to adopt the Bill of Rights.”).
150
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Katz and Smith and the initial reaction by the Supreme
Court in respect to seizing electronic communications).
151
See supra Part II.B; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the two
questions presented in Smith for determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists).
152
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the problematic interaction of the above mentioned SCA
provisions).
153
See infra Part III.B (analyzing problems faced by the judiciary due to the confusing
application of the SCA).
154
See supra Part II.C.; c.f. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 475. Steinberg notes that the battle
line is drawn where some theorists favor judicial decisions over statutory regulations in
regard to “sense-enhanced searches.” Id. Steinberg further states that “[s]cholars favoring
regulation through the Fourth Amendment emphasize the accessibility of Fourth
149
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communication in today’s world.155 The first problem arises because
section 2703 allows the government to obtain an account holder’s
account information without providing notice to the account holder.156
The next issue arises because of the variety of methods that exist for
obtaining e-mail contents without providing notice to account holders
and delaying notice for lengthy periods of time.157 ISP employees
certainly have the potential to rummage through the private e-mail of
individual account holders.158 Last, the backup preservation option
available to the government under section 2704 should be enough to
permit the government to secure any desired evidence without using
more intrusive options.159 All of these conditions combined create great
potential for Fourth Amendment violations.
The backup provision under the SCA is one of the government’s
greatest powers in providing insurance against evidence destruction.160
As if this is not enough, the government also has the power to delay
notice to account holders under the backup provision.161 Therefore, even
though a backup file of electronic evidence is created, if the government
believes that notice to the subscriber could still result in the destruction
of this evidence, it may extend the delay of notice for ninety day
increments.162 The original period of delayed notice appropriately gives
the government ninety days to sort out its case, but a constitutional
problem results when the renewals of the ninety day delays are
granted.163 In addition, problems have resulted where the government
failed to renew its request for delayed notice, leading to periods as long

Amendment doctrine and the complexity of statutes. Scholars favoring regulation by
statutes emphasize the specificity of statutory law and the vagueness of Fourth
Amendment standards.” Id.
155
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (discussing how e-mail contains the
same privacy expectations as letters and closed containers).
156
See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text (discussing procedures the government
must follow when obtaining account holder information).
157
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the delayed notice provision).
158
See infra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (analyzing the potential for privacy
breaches during searches).
159
See supra note 132. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. As an additional
evidential safeguard, the emerging hard disk recovery technology is also available. Id.
160
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing statutory requirements that the government must
meet before requesting to backup a user’s e-mail).
161
18 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(2) (2006).
162
See Swartz & Johnson, supra note 20. The reasoning for this extension stems from the
varying lengths of e-mail preservation by ISPs themselves. Id. See supra note 136
(discussing the applicability of the delayed notice provision to the backup provision).
163
See supra Part II.3 (discussing the delayed notice provision of section 2703 of the SCA).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 6

710

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

as twelve months without governmental notification to the user
regarding the seizure.164
Section 2705 addresses renewals for delay of notice.165
The
problematic aspect of delayed notice is that it applies to the most
intrusive part of the SCA—government requests to obtain contents of email as provided by section 2703.166 Traditionally, governmental entities
have provided notice of searches involving paper documents
contemporaneously and not retroactively, and e-mail should be treated
similarly due to its increasing role in displacing paper documents.167 At
first blush, the delayed notice provision seems to provide for only a
ninety day extension.168 However, closer observation reveals that the
government may be granted extensions of up to ninety days in
accordance with section 2705.169 More specifically, the subsection of
section 2705 that addresses preclusion of notice—the provision that
allows the government to forego notifying account holders that it has
seized the account holder’s records—gives the government an
opportunity to petition the court for a period of time that is “deemed
appropriate” to refrain from notifying the account subscriber that the
government is reading the subscriber’s e-mail.170 Theoretically, this
could be for an infinite period of time.
Upon expiration of the delayed notice period, the government must
inform the subscriber of the nature of government contact with the ISP,
including information about the delayed notification and details of the
court ordered delay.171 The problem with delayed and precluded notice
is that by the time the subscriber finds out about the seizure, it is too late
164
Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007),
modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III).
165
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing provisions of section 2705 of the SCA).
166
See Pikowsky, supra note 11, at 27–28 (discussing the problems with retrospective
notice issues). Pikowsky confirmed that retrospective searches are less invasive than
prospective searches. Id.
167
Id. at 29. Pikowsky observed:
[W]here the police secretly copy files from a person’s mailbox at his
ISP or covertly break into a person’s office to copy files from his
personal computer, the privacy interest at stake is as great as a
person’s privacy interest in his telephone calls. Therefore, the
protections of that privacy interest should be the same.
Id.
168
18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(A) (2006).
169
Id. §§ 2705(a)(4), 2705(b).
170
Id. § 2705(b).
171
See supra note 140 (discussing procedures of notification upon expiration of sealed
notice).
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for the person to correct violations of his or her privacy.172 The
government can obtain important information from e-mails other than
just the content of the message, such as date, time, sender, and receiver
information.173 This could result in additional leads and information that
may be allowed as evidence which would never have been obtained but
for the violation of the privacy interest a user has in his e-mail account.174
The next problematic provision of the SCA that has the potential of
violating an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights involves the way
that e-mail contents are obtained without official supervision.175
It is true that the Fourth Amendment does not require supervision of
searches where civilian searches may be more reasonable than searches
performed by police officers.176 In fact, some situations, such as body
cavity searches, present an example where privacy is greater outside the
presence of an officer.177 However, some people argue that an e-mail
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the SCA’s delayed notice provision).
41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 1, at § 1.
Other aspects of the electronic information that are not considered part
of the body or context of a message or file, but can be of immense
importance, include date and time stamps reflecting the date of saving
or transmission and the date of receipt, and a message’s list of
recipients.
Id. § 2. This article discussed that it is important for counsel to use electronic data to
“become familiar with the forensics of the recovery and reconstruction of such data[]”
when e-mails have been deleted from the system. Id. § 1. See also Dempsey, supra note 26,
at 411 (noting that e-mails may contain private information). Dempsey stated:
More and more of our lives are conducted online and more and more
personal information is transmitted and stored electronically.
Financial statements, medical data[,] and records of commercial
transactions are computerized. Increasingly, book purchases, travel
itineraries, and movie rentals are complied [sic] and stored online in
“personal accounts.” Most recently, storage has taken a new turn, as
individuals use network capabilities to store draft documents,
photos[,] and messages long since sent and retrieved--the kind of
material once kept on paper and secure in a home or office.
Id. See also Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J.
139, 139 (2005) (suggesting that it is surprising that this information can be accessed easier
than a “search [of] our houses or even our cars[]”). Id.
174
See Slobogin, supra note 173, at 139.
175
See Steere, supra note 117, at 233 (stating that the ECPA “fails to provide enough
protection to satisfy the true historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment[]”).
176
United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2002). See Zittrain, supra note 148 at
93 (“A lack of oversight or adversarial process for the kinds of searches that are about to
become common threatens to have the exceptions dwarf the rule.”)
177
See Rodriques v. Furtado, 575 N.E.2d 1124, 1126 (Mass. 1991). In Rodriques, police
reasonably obtained a “warrant to search the plaintiff’s vagina for narcotics” that included
permission for that search “to be conducted by a licensed physician . . . .” Id. at 1126
(quotations omitted). The court held that although it was a troublesome outcome, the
doctors were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1130.
172
173
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search, without officers present, drastically decreases the amount of
privacy afforded to individuals.178 One commentator called such
unsupervised searches “sense-enhanced search[es,]” noting that these
differ from the traditional “physical search.”179 To decide how much
protection needs to be afforded during a search, courts consider the
following factors: space available for physical presence, technical
expertise of the person conducting the search, and location of the items
seized.180 Therefore, if the circumstances present themselves, it is likely
that many seizures conducted without a police officer could violate
Fourth Amendment rights because of the highly private correspondence
that e-mails contain and the likelihood of exposure to ISP employees. In
comparison, United States postal workers, similar to ISP employees,
would not open mail without ensuring that a police officer supervises
the search, even where a warrant has been obtained.181
Additionally, e-mail searches are not supposed to be an all-access
pass for the government.182 Decades ago, the great statesman Henry
Stimson observed, “Gentlemen [and ladies] do not read each other’s
mail.”183 The Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent the “hated

Bach, 310 F.3d at 1067.
See Steinberg, supra note 9, at 466 n.1 (Steinberg describes his use of the term “‘senseenhanced search’ to describe police examination of a person or [his] property through the
use of some method that provides information not available to unaided sensory
perceptions[]” and the term “‘physical search’ to describe the traditional police search,
which relies on unaided sensory perception[]”).
180
Bach, 310 F.3d at 1067. In Bach, the court provided the following factors for evaluating
the reasonableness of officer presence:
(1) the actual physical presence of an officer would not have aided the
search (in fact may have hindered it); (2) the technical expertise of
Yahoo!’s technicians far outweighs that of the officers; (3) the items
“seized” were located on Yahoo!’s property; (4) there was a warrant
signed by a judge authorizing the search; and (5) the officers complied
with the provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2701.
Id.
181
See supra note 45 (discussing a postal worker’s lack of authority during a search and
seizure of postal mail).
182
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2004). In Theofel, the court
found an e-mail search under the SCA to be invalid where the government’s subpoena was
overbroad. Id. The subpoena was not narrowed and the government took all e-mails from
the desired account. Id. at 1071. See also Robert M. Goldstein & Martin G. Weinberg, The
Stored Communications Act and Private E-Mail Communications, CHAMPION, Aug. 2007, at 18
(concluding that the SCA provides the government with a “wholesale seizure” of its
targets’ e-mails).
183
See Steere, supra note 117, at 249 (quoting HENRY L. STIMSON, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN
PEACE AND WAR 7 (1948)) (alteration in original).
178
179

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/6

Cuccia: Have You Seen My Inbox? Government Oversteps the Fourth Amendment

2009]

E-Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment

713

writs” that surfaced in the eighteenth century.184 The idea is that
government e-mail searches via warrant are narrowed by address, search
terms, or time frames.185 This narrowed search is supposed to protect
account holder privacy, but often does not have the opportunity to be
effective because the government typically seizes entire accounts without
any narrowing guidelines.186 Searches and seizures that are not
narrowly tailored and that are open to ISP employee rummaging violate
the Fourth Amendment.187
When combined, the SCA’s provisions overwhelmingly cut in favor
the government and deny meaningful protection to account-holding
individuals.188 The delayed notice provision can be stretched to such an
extent that it can preclude notice entirely, despite other sufficient
methods of preserving evidence such as file backups provided by the
SCA.189
Additionally, the lack of supervision of searches is
problematic.190 This is especially true in situations where notice has not
been provided to an account holder and the search is performed
unbeknownst to the account holder.191 Despite the government’s
invasive power and lack of protection for individuals, courts have not
provided consistent guidance when deciding cases involving sections
2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA.192
B. Jurisprudential Inconsistencies
Courts have been inconsistent when ruling on the constitutionality
of the SCA, specifically sections 2703 and 2705.193 Subjective and open184
See Snyder, supra note 10, at 1 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 n.13
(1965)).
185
O’Grady v. Superior Ct., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1448 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2006).
Seeking disclosure of records or information from an identified sender or receiver can be
considered outside of the statutory authorization. Id.
186
See supra note 92 (discussing Yahoo! and the privacy breaches that occur when e-mail
searches are not narrowed).
187
See Snyder, supra note 10, at 4. When general warrants were issued, “officials, broke
down at least 20 doors and scores of trunks, and broke hundreds of locks.” Id. Further,
“the Fourth Amendment prohibits indiscriminate searches regardless of the technology
involved[] . . . .” Id. at 6.
188
See supra Parts II.C.1–3 (discussing the interaction of sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of
the SCA).
189
See supra Part II.C.3 (outlining the delayed notice provision of the SCA).
190
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing faxed warrants and seizures of
entire accounts due to lack of official supervision).
191
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing delayed notice provisions).
192
See infra Part III.B (describing jurisprudential inconsistencies).
193
Frederick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart, Liability for All, Privacy for None: the
Conundrum of Protecting Privacy Rights in a Pervasive Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REV.
1481, 1482 (2007) (stating that “[c]onsequently, the current state of the law has left
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ended terms in the Act leave room for much discretion and resemble the
general warrants that the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution precludes.194
Furthermore, the lack of procedural
safeguards and lack of checks on government provide great potential for
the government to violate the constitutional privacy rights afforded to email account holders.195
To start, laws that govern ISPs must take into account that providers
are not all the same: each provider has different requirements that
governmental entities must meet when requesting account holder
information, and a comprehensive law must account for these
differences.196 Research regarding how an ISP storage system operates
could shed light on exactly how search engines can be effective in
generating results from the term searches included in warrants and
subpoenas.197 Currently, general warrants are illegal and the term
searches must be narrowed; however, currently term searches are often
not narrowed.198 Due to the reality of generalized searches, more

government, businesses, and private citizens without a clear sense of their legal rights,
obligations, and liabilities[]”). See also Steinberg, supra note 9, at 466–71 (concluding that
Supreme Court decisions, where “sense-enhanced searches[]” are at issue, are inconsistent,
arbitrary, and fail to develop a coherent body of law). The statutory framework of the
ECPA in general has been described as “notoriously confusing and unclear[,]” whereas
“Fourth Amendment concepts tend to be relatively accessible.” Id. at 475 (citing Daniel J.
Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 747 (2005)).
194
See supra Part II.C.4 (describing that by proposing an amendment to the SCA,
Congress acknowledged the reality of objective searches).
195
See supra Parts II.C.1–4 (outlining SCA sections 2703, 2704, and 2705).
196
See supra Part II.A (discussing specifics about ISPs and acknowledging the wide
variety of capabilities among various ISPs).
197
See supra Part II.A. See also 41 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 1, at § 1 (stating that
e-mail often provides “smoking gun” evidence, and noting that e-mail can be recovered
and reconstructed from computer files).
[C]omputer data is not safe from disclosure merely because it has been
“deleted” from a system or is contained in a damaged disk or hard
drive. “Using sophisticated computer programs, electronic mail
messages or computer files thought to be deleted can be retrieved from
the deep recesses of a computer data base long after they have
disappeared from the screen.” Given the potential value of such
material, “[m]ore and more jilted employees, angry business rivals,
and injured consumers are waging legal wars with floppy disks and
hard drives.”
Id. (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
198
See supra note 84 (suggesting specifics of how to narrow searches through fields and
keywords).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/6

Cuccia: Have You Seen My Inbox? Government Oversteps the Fourth Amendment

2009]

E-Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment

715

supervision is necessary to ensure that government officials engage in
appropriate ISP account searching.199
The lack of concern for the privacy of e-mail content is almost
certainly due to the limited knowledge that account holders have about
their privacy rights when it comes to their e-mail account.200 This has to
be a valid assumption due to judicial holdings and the opinions of legal
theorists that e-mail is private and protected by the Fourth
Amendment.201 Conversely, the fact that e-mail is constitutionally
protected should give account holders the assurance that nobody can
subpoena or search their e-mail.202
Electronic communications law that began developing with Katz in
the 1960s is applicable to e-mail.203 As an account holder, knowledge of
network policies and how they apply to usage can be extremely
valuable.204 Theoretically, network administrators may decide exactly
how much privacy to give their account holders.205 Furthermore, the
Smith third-party approach is valid in conjunction with users’
expectation of privacy.206 Writing an e-mail from an Internet café with
six friends huddled around as a joke would not likely result in a
legitimate expectation of privacy. On the other hand, an individual who
solely composes and sends an e-mail from the same Internet café while
sitting in the corner would likely have legitimate privacy expectations.207
199
See supra notes 131, 180 (discussing how implementing the requirement of a police
officer’s presence during searches provides more structure to the search and provides
supervision, without which ISP employees become lazy and reveal full account content).
200
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussion of delayed notice).
201
See supra Part II.B (summarizing the development of electronic communications
jurisprudence, first addressing seizures of letters and telephones and subsequently
addressing e-mail seizures).
202
See supra Part II.B (discussing the Smith third-party doctrine and server policies as
avenues for the government to circumvent notice to the account holder); see also United
States v. Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 340 (D. Puerto Rico 2007) (suggesting that the
ECPA is “hardly a legislative determination that this expectation of privacy is one that rises
to the level of ‘reasonably objective’ for Fourth Amendment purposes[]”).
203
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the development of electronic communications case
law).
204
See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing reasonable expectations and privacy policies and
jurisprudence relating to both).
205
See supra Part II.B.5 (analyzing the structure of privacy policies as related to
reasonable expectations by users).
206
See supra Part II.B.1; c.f. United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 118 (D. Mass.
2007) (suppressing evidence gained from a phone call to the Department of Social Services
by a third party who provided an e-mail link and password for access to pictures that
incriminated defendants). D’Andrea held that the third party doctrine trumps the
expectation of privacy when information is conveyed to an outsider and that outsider
conveys the information to the authorities. Id. at 123.
207
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Katz’s requirements to protect communications).
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E-mail has been distinguished by the SCA based on the length of
time that it is stored.208 The arbitrary length of time of 180 days is
assigned to determine through which procedural channels the
Government must navigate.209 Coincidently, such an arbitrary time
frame does not apply to searches of letters and sealed containers.210
Likely, similar information will result from seizures of information from
both time frames.211 For example, the information from an account that
sends payment reminders or confirmation messages to an individual’s email account is likely archived and will result in the same information
retrieved whether the search is targeted at the last week or the last
year.212 The government should have to prove the desired time frame
and the desired content for the search because an account holder’s entire
e-mail account is likely to have the same privacy expectations attached to
it.213 Additionally, account information is a source of evidence that the
government can easily obtain along with third-party communication as
an alternative source that is less invasive of privacy.214 By giving the
government direct access to e-mail content, the government circumvents
long established privacy rights granted by the Fourth Amendment.215
The uniqueness of e-mail should make it easier for the government
to preserve evidence while building a case. Unlike letters, packages, and
telephone calls, e-mail inevitably leaves an electronic trail.216 Section
2704 grants to the government the powerful tool of account
preservation.217 Given the knowledge of such capabilities, questions
should be raised as to why unlimited and objective delayed notice
procedures in Section 2705 are necessary.218 The analogy drawn could be
as follows: if the government has the power of a fully armed tank, such
See supra Part II.C.1; supra note 126 (discussing the 181-day storage length for e-mail
where e-mails more than 180 days old are easier for the Government to seize).
209
See supra Part II.C.1; see also supra note 126 (discussing the Plaintiff-Appellee brief in
Warshak I, which explains why the 180-day time frame seems arbitrary to the average
subscriber).
210
See infra text accompanying note 233 (claiming that e-mails and paper letters should
be treated similarly).
211
See supra note 126 (addressing the Warshak I brief’s discussion of the arbitrary 180-day
timeframe for e-mail storage).
212
See supra note 126 (addressing the Warshak I brief’s discussion of the arbitrary 180-day
timeframe for e-mail storage).
213
See supra notes 84, 182, 186 (discussing the narrowing of searches).
214
See supra note 123 (citing text of the account information provision of the SCA).
215
See supra Part II.B (discussing the background of electronic communications law that
has strictly applied the Fourth Amendment).
216
See supra Part II.A (outlining technical ISP basics).
217
See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining the application of section 2704 of the SCA to e-mail
account preservation).
218
See supra Part II.C.3 (explaining the delayed notice provision of the SCA).
208
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as section 2704, then why does it need the musket-like power of section
2705? The simple answer is that it does not, and account holders are
victims of an excessive and unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
E-mail serves as a communication highway and should be
vehemently protected as private under the Fourth Amendment, just as
letters and telephone calls have been in the past.219 Because of the ease
with which e-mail content is obtained from ISPs, the government has
intruded upon the privacy that account holders believe guard their
interests.220 Arbitrary and objective provisions in sections 2703, 2704,
and 2705 combined have left the judiciary ill-equipped to address
today’s e-mail issues, and the fifty-year-old doctrine of Katz has
prevailed as the solution.221
Simple adjustments can be made to the above mentioned sections of
the SCA that will enhance the way in which the sections interact and
reduce invasive governmental actions concerning private e-mail. It is
possible to protect individual privacy, give the government ample power
to ensure national security, and bring the SCA back within the bounds of
the Constitution by amending the SCA, as proposed next in Part IV, to
cure its problematic sections.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Reliance on protections such [as] individual computer accounts, password
protection, and perhaps encryption of data should be no less reasonable than
reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each form of
protection is penetrable.222
See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing notions of privacy attached to e-mail); see also supra
Part II.B.1 (discussing initial judicial decisions involving electronic privacy issues such as
Katz and Smith).
220
See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing the presumed privacy that account holders believe
attaches to e-mail).
221
See supra note 94 (discussing the Warshak I court’s analysis of the similarities between
telephone content and e-mail content). See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979)
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967)). The Smith court explicitly
“rejected the argument that a ‘search’ can occur only when there has been a ‘physical
intrusion’ into a ‘constitutionally protected area,’ noting that the Fourth Amendment
‘protects people, not places.’” Id. at 739 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–53).
222
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6 at 721 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Randolph
S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA.
L. REV. 1181, 1200 (1995)). LaFave finds that e-mail has a justified expectation of privacy
because it offers greater security than faxes, mail, shipping services and land-line
conversations. Id. at 726. However, once the e-mail reaches a recipient, akin to a letter
reaching its destination, the person who sent the item “has no valid Fourth Amendment
complaint should the recipient turn the message over to the police or forward it on to
others, or should the recipient turn out to be an undercover police officer.” Id. at 727
(footnotes omitted).
219

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 6

718

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Courts have not effectively addressed the issue of e-mail privacy
because the SCA provisions became confusing and unclear as technology
strayed from using simplistic locks and bolts to protect our personal
items.223 Furthermore, when courts apply the law, they are wary of
Fourth Amendment conflicts that inevitably arise.224
Too many
governmental safeguards conflict with constitutional guarantees of
privacy.225 Some of the procedural aspects of the SCA must be
downgraded to enhance notions of privacy.226 Therefore, this Note
suggests the following amendments to the sections of the SCA that are
problematic—sections 2703, 2304, and 2705.227 First, the 180 day time
frame of e-mail preservations should be eliminated in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)
to allow for a more even application in regard to e-mail seizures.228
Next, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) must be modified to require police officer
presence during searches of e-mail at electronic communications services
or remote computing centers.229 Last, 18 U.S.C. § 2705 must be amended
to clarify the objective terminology in § 2705(a)(5) describing an “adverse
result,” heighten the standard for preclusion notice in § 2705(b), and
explicitly grant injunctive relief when notice is not given at the expiration
of delay periods for § 2705.230
A. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) as follows, with the
normal font representing the current statutory language, the text with a
line through it representing the text the author of this Note proposes to
delete from the statute, and the italicized text representing the text the
author of this Note proposes to add to the statute:
(a) Contents of wire or electronic communications in
electronic storage.—A governmental entity may require
the disclosure by a provider of electronic
communication service of the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in
See supra Part III.B (analyzing issues courts deal with when interpreting conflicts
between the SCA and the Fourth Amendment).
224
See supra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing Warshak I, Allen, Ashcroft (Doe I), and Gonzalez (Doe
II)).
225
See supra Part III.A (analyzing sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA).
226
See supra Part III.A (analyzing sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA).
227
See infra Part IV.
228
See infra Part IV.A.
229
See infra Part IV.B.
230
See infra Parts IV.C–D.
223
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an electronic communications system for one hundred
and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant
issued using the procedures described in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction
over the offense under investigation or equivalent State
warrant.
A governmental entity may require the
disclosure by a provider of electronic communications
services of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication that has been in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for more than one
hundred and eighty days, and by the means available
under subsection (b) of this section.
Commentary
This proposed amendment to section 2703(a) is one way courts, ISPs,
and account holders can apply the SCA as a blanket when executing a
search. Trying to figure out the time distinction as the statute currently
states is a waste of valuable resources because in the end individual
account holders subjectively regard all of their e-mail as having the same
amount of privacy.231 Furthermore, objectively, the public at large does
not use time as a factor for distinguishing whether the correspondence is
more or less private.232 Last, e-mails are said to be given the same
amount of privacy as sealed letters and telephone calls, which do not
operate on a scaled, time frame basis. Therefore, just because it is easier
to preserve e-mails on a server, than to preserve letters in a shoebox, emails should not be treated drastically different than letters in a
shoebox.233
B. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g)
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) as follows, with the
normal font representing the current statutory language and the text
with a line through it representing the text the author of this Note
proposes to delete from the statute.
(g) Presence of officer not required.—Notwithstanding
section 3105 of this title,The presence of an officer shall
not be required for service or execution of a search
warrant issued in accordance with this chapter requiring
231
232
233

See supra note 126 (Warshak I court discussing the time limits placed by the SCA).
See supra note 126 (Warshak I court discussing the time limits placed by the SCA).
See supra note 95 (analogizing letters and sealed containers to e-mails).
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disclosure by a provider of electronic communications
service or remote computing service of the contents of
communications or records or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service.
Commentary
This proposed amendment to section 2703(g) is a means to the end of
preserving privacy. Within the same title, under the current statutory
language, section 3105 requires officer presence during the service and
execution of the warrant; however, section 2703 is exempt from this
requirement. This proposed amendment to the current language reins in
the power of employees to haphazardly sift through e-mails, while, at
the same time, adequately preserves the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
of privacy.234 Additionally, officer presence enhances the search and
seizure of e-mails by adding authority to the process.235 Like postal
employees, who are not allowed to open letters even when a warrant is
presented, ISP workers should not have that power either.236 Therefore,
this minor and important adjustment enhances the process in a variety of
ways.
C. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(5)
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(5) as follows, with the
normal font representing the current statutory language and the
italicized text representing the text the author of this Note proposes to
add to the statute.
(a)(5) Upon expiration of the period of delay of
notification under paragraph (1) or (4) of this subsection,
the governmental entity shall serve upon, or deliver by
registered or first-class mail to, the customer or
subscriber a copy of the process or request together with
notice that—
(A) states with reasonable specificity the nature
of the law enforcement inquiry; and
(B) informs such customer or subscriber—

See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (analyzing the need for law
enforcement officer presence during an e-mail search).
235
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing one theorist’s view on police
officer presence during e-mail searches).
236
See supra note 45 (discussing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878)).
234
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(i) that information maintained for
such customer or subscriber by the
service provider named in such
process or request was supplied to
or requested by that governmental
authority and the date on which the
supplying or request took place;
(ii) that notification of such customer or
subscriber was delayed;
(iii) what governmental entity or court
made
the
certification
or
determination pursuant to which
that delay was made; and
(iv) which provision of this chapter
allowed such delay.
If, upon expiration of the delay, notice is not served as dictated
above to the account holder, then injunctive relief shall be
granted barring all seized documents from evidence.
Commentary
Language describing an injunction must be added to the delayed
notice provision as a restraint on government abuse. Currently,
government actors do not provide notice to account holders whose
circumstances have fallen under this provision, which results in a Fourth
Amendment violation.237 The SCA does not currently explicitly state
that injunctive relief is proper.238 This amendment to section 2705(a)(5)
will provide much needed clarity for courts; it will be clear that any
unauthorized e-mails obtained in violation of giving notice shall be
excluded from evidence. Thus, this proposed change will save judicial
resources and provide a constitutionally just result to the account holder.
D. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) as follows, with the
normal font representing the current statutory language, the text with a
line through it representing the text the author of this Note proposes to
delete from the statute, and the italicized text representing the text the
author of this Note proposes to add to the statute.

See supra notes 84, 182, 186 (discussing the use of broad, not narrow, searches by ISPs
to protect privacy).
238
See supra note 92 (discussing suppression remedies and the Fourth Amendment).
237
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(b) Preclusion of notice to subject of governmental
access.—A governmental entity acting under section
2703, when it is not required to notify the subscriber or
customer under section 2703(b)(1), or to the extent that it
may delay such notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, may apply to a court for an order commanding a
provider of electronic communications service or remote
computing service to whom a warrant, subpoena, or
court order is directed, for such period as the court
deems appropriateninety days, not to notify any other
person of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or
court order. The court shall enter such an order if it
determines that there is reason to believe that
notification of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or
court order will result in—
(1) endangering the life or physical safety of an
individual;
(2) flight from prosecution;
(3) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or
unduly delaying trial.
Commentary
Delayed notice creates the biggest Fourth Amendment concern for
subscribers.239 By delaying notice that the government seized and
examined the contents of private e-mail, section 2705 as it is currently
drafted exceeds governmental limits as designated in the Constitution.240
To curtail the effect of lack of notice, the unlimited preclusion for delay
must be deleted from the SCA and a designated timeframe added, such
as ninety days.241 This proposed change enhances the SCA, brings it
back within Fourth Amendment guarantees, and leaves open the
opportunity to merge section 2705(b) with section 2705(a)(4), which
provides a consistent approach for efficiency’s sake. Additionally,
section 2705(b)(5) should enumerate examples to lessen the objective
nature of court decisions. Such objectivity can lead to entirely different
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing delayed notice); see also supra Part III.A (analyzing the
same).
240
See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional problems
with delayed notice).
241
See supra text accompanying note 170 (discussing the potential infinite preclusion of
notice).
239

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/6

Cuccia: Have You Seen My Inbox? Government Oversteps the Fourth Amendment

2009]

E-Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment

723

outcomes and, when privacy is at issue, individual rights should not
tolerate this inconsistency.242 Finally, this proposed change restrains the
SCA from violating privacy rights by still providing direction to the
government and courts regarding how to search and seize e-mail from
third party ISPs.
The above proposed amendments to the SCA together will reduce
the likelihood of unconstitutional encroachment on account holders’
privacy rights.243 As demonstrated, the proposed changes are not
drastic, and yet, effectively achieve the goals of the government and
account holders, and assist courts in interpreting the SCA.
By
minimizing excessive governmental safeguards, the proposed
amendments streamline the SCA to protect both the Government’s
interest in preserving evidence and the subscriber’s interest in
maintaining privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Tolling for the aching ones whose wounds cannot be nursed
For the countless confused, accused, misused, strung-out ones an’ worse
An’ for every hung-up person in the whole wide universe
An’ we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing.244
Freedom from search and seizure will soon be a flash before the eyes
of many Americans as Fourth Amendment interests are trampled by the
SCA. Too much time has passed without action to restore e-mail account
holder privacy interests. If the amendments to the SCA proposed in Part
IV of this Note are implemented, then embarrassment, like the
embarrassment described in Part I suffered by John Jones’s family, will
be eliminated or certainly mitigated. Pursuant to the amendments
proposed in Part IV, the government would not be allowed to search email contents without a warrant, and the search would be supervised

See supra note 92 (comparing United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C.
2007) and Warshak v. United States (Warshak I), 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated on
other grounds en banc by No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007),
modified by 2007 WL 4410237 (S.D. OH Dec. 13, 2007) (Warshak II), rev’d on other grounds by
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Warshak III)).
243
See supra Part II.C (comparing sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA, and
discussing the way all three sections interact together).
244
BOB DYLAN, CHIMES OF FREEDOM (Legacy Recordings 1964). Released in 1964, just
three years before the United States Supreme Court decided Katz, Chimes of Freedom may be
analogized to today’s invasion of e-mail privacy. See id. See also Mike Marqusee, CHIMES
OF FREEDOM: THE POLITICS OF BOB DYLAN’S ART (2003). Chimes of Freedom represented a
transition between Dylan’s early protest style and his later poetic tendencies, and serves as
a warning that the problems of yesterday are still faced today. See Marqusee, supra.
242

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 6

724

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

and narrowly tailored, thus discouraging Betty Eyez from her nosy
habits. By applying the suggested changes as proposed, Congress will
be able to rein in the government’s unconstitutional behavior and still
achieve the goal of preserving evidence.
E-mail is the communication of today’s world. It is not limited to
just today’s children, but also yesterday’s children, as parents and
grandparents increasingly log on to their computers to see what awaits
them in their e-mail inboxes. As the variety of transactions from our
home computers increases exponentially, account holders’ privacy
interests become all the more precious. The SCA is currently written in
such a way that leaves too many standards open-ended. Courts have
inconsistently interpreted the SCA, leaving many questions remaining
about how to apply sections 2703, 2704, and 2705 of the SCA, while not
offending the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals. Congress
should revise the SCA according to the amendments proposed in Part IV
and ensure the privacy guarantees on which our Founders established
this country. As Justice Stewart so eloquently stated thirty years ago,
“[privacy] considerations do not vanish when the search in question is
transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that
of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that
he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”245
Kimberly S. Cuccia∗
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